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TO CONFUSE AND PROTECT:  TAXES AND 
CONSUMER PROTECTION 
Jacob ussim* 
Imperfect information may cause rationally bounded 
individuals to make consistent mistakes.  This paper 
focuses on potential misperception of prices.  Consumers 
may underestimate the full price of tax-exclusive prices and 
hence overconsume goods and services.  Countries with a 
significant consumption tax base (for example, a value-
added tax) regulate tax-inclusive price presentation to 
overcome consumers’ biases and thus to protect 
consumers.  The United States is considering the adoption 
of a federal consumption tax base and therefore may be 
similarly expected to regulate tax-inclusive price 
presentation.  Based on a theory of optimal taxation, this 
paper explains why tax-exclusive rather than tax-inclusive 
prices can be socially desirable.  To the extent that tax-
exclusive pricing confuses consumers who then ignore non-
indicated taxes and overconsume, consumers may be better 
off.  The argument is counterintuitive, in particular for 
consumer-protection advocates:  confusion is actually good 
for consumers.  The paper investigates several potential 
justifications for tax-inclusive pricing, and shows that a 
reasonably accepted rationale is rather limited in scope 
and unrelated to consumer-protection motivations.  
Finally, the paper extends the analysis to income-based 
taxes and to misleading non-tax (marketing) practices. 
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 INTRODUCTION 
Imperfect information causes individuals to make mistakes.  Due to 
imperfect rationality, individuals’ mistakes may become consistent—i.e., 
biased—and hence decrease their welfare further.1  The literature on 
consumer behavior offers many examples of consumers’ mistakes that are 
considered systematic misperceptions.2  Sellers may utilize recognized 
consumer biases to their own advantage and further hurt consumer welfare.  
Accordingly, legal intervention may be warranted, ranging from 
information regulation through standard regulation to price and quality 
 
 1. This paper adopts a welfarist approach under which the atomic unit of analysis is 
individual welfare or well-being.  See generally LOUIS KAPLOW, THE THEORY OF TAXATION 
AND PUBLIC ECONOMICS 348–58 (2008) (describing the welfarist methodology) [hereinafter 
KAPLOW, THEORY OF TAXATION]; LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS 
WELFARE 15–38, 381–464 (2002) (same). 
 2. This literature is extensive.  A few examples are Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by 
Plastic, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1373 (2003) (discussing consumers’ biases in the credit card 
market); Alon Harel & Ehud Guttel, Matching Probabilities:  The Behavioral Law and 
Economics of Repeated Behavior, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 1197 (2005) (investigating legal 
applications of the probability-matching bias); John D. Hanson & Douglas D. Kysar, Taking 
Behavioralism Seriously:  The Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630 
(1999) (reviewing causes for consumers’ misperception and potential abuses of such biases 
by market participants); Cass R. Sunstein, Boundedly Rational Borrowing, 73 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 249 (2006) (discussing biases that lead to excessive borrowing, and their potential legal 
responses); Yuval Feldman & Doron Teichman, Are All “Legal Dollars” Created Equal?, 
102 NW. U. L. REV. 223 (2008) (showing experimentally how various characteristics of legal 
payments affect perception of value); Russell B. Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal 
Analysis, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1227 (2002) (investigating the application of the endowment 
effect in legal contexts); Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk 
Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683 (1998) (discussing the possibility of distorted perception 
due to the process of collective belief formation). 
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controls.3 
Taxes may also introduce problems of partial information and 
bounded rationality.  In the political market, voters (i.e., political 
consumers) may lack the relevant and accurate information about their tax 
burden (and received public benefits) and hence make mistakes in their 
choice of political representatives (i.e., political sellers).  If, in addition, 
voters lack full rationality, they may make consistent mistakes in assessing 
their tax burdens and accordingly in voting for the preferred political 
candidate.  The “fiscal illusion” hypothesis contends that voters 
systematically underestimate tax burdens (and overestimate public 
benefits).4  Similar to the product market, politicians can exploit voters’ 
ignorance and impose higher taxes (or provide fewer public goods), to their 
own benefit and to the detriment of individuals.  Yet, the empirical validity 
of the fiscal illusion hypothesis is still doubtful.5 
But imperfect tax information may also benefit—and hence may be 
utilized by—market participants rather than political representatives.  
Partial information about consumption taxes (for example, sales taxes, 
value-added taxes) and consumers’ bounded rationality can increase 
suppliers’ profits at the expense of consumers.  Consumers may 
consistently underestimate the price of goods and services when 
information about consumption taxes is imperfect.  Specifically, when 
prices of goods and services are stated tax-exclusive—that is, prices 
exclude sales tax—consumers may perceive prices to be lower than they 
actually are, and thus increase their demand for such goods and services. 
This potential phenomenon is somewhat similar to the effect of 
price partitioning, under which prices of good and services are partitioned 
into several components like subscription, shipping and handling, and 
processing fees.6  Sellers increasingly use price partition strategies in the 
market with the purpose of increasing consumer demand, and hence market 
prices and sellers profits—again, at the expense of consumers’ welfare.7  
Sellers’ ability to additionally partition consumption taxes probably 
 
 3. Again, the literature is ample.  See, e.g., Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Uncertain 
Psychological Case for Paternalism, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1165, 1177–1206 (2003) (supplying 
a partial list of articles on the topic). 
 4. See, e.g., JAMES BUCHANAN, PUBLIC FINANCE IN DEMOCRATIC PROCESS 126–43 
(1967) (suggesting the fiscal illusion hypothesis and discussing its applications). 
 5. See infra note 59.  See also infra notes 166–70 and accompanying text. 
 6. See infra notes 69–77 and accompanying text.  See also Vicki G. Morwitz et al., 
The Price Does ot Include Additional Taxes, Fees, and Surcharges:  A Review of Research 
on Partitioned Pricing (Working Paper 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1350004 
(last visited May 14, 2010) (reviewing the price partitioning literature) [hereinafter Morwitz, 
Price Does ot Include]. 
 7. See, e.g., Morwitz, Price Does ot Include, supra note 6, at 4–10. 
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generates a similar effect, and indeed businesses invariably oppose tax-
inclusive price regulation.8 
European countries commonly adopt relatively high consumption 
tax (i.e., VAT) rates and are therefore well aware of such consumer 
confusion or biases due to tax-exclusive price presentation.  Accordingly, 
most European countries regulate price presentation through their consumer 
protection laws, and in particular require tax-inclusive price presentation.9  
Other OECD countries like Canada and Australia are facing increasing 
political demand to adopt such regulatory measures.10 
Since the income (rather than consumption) tax base traditionally 
has dominated the US tax system, no similar concern has been introduced 
so far in this country.  But expected changes in the American tax base mix 
may divert attention to price presentation issues.  First, state sales taxes are 
rising (though they are still lower than European VAT).11  Second, and 
more importantly, in the last three decades, pressure has been building up in 
academia and government (in particular, the Treasury) toward the adoption 
of a federal consumption tax base, whether as a replacement of or as a 
supplement to the federal income tax.12  Proposals take the form of a 
national retail tax or national value-added tax.13  A federal consumption tax 
system would impose considerably higher tax rates and burdens than 
current state sales taxes,14 and most likely would introduce a similar public 
demand for European-style consumer protection regulation in the form of 
tax-inclusive prices. 
This Article reevaluates the “consumer protection” hypothesis—
that is, that regulation of tax-inclusive prices would increase social welfare 
since consumers underestimate tax-exclusive prices and hence tend to over-
consume.  It raises the opposite, counter-intuitive argument:  to the extent 
that non-included taxes confuse consumers, who tend to under-estimate tax-
exclusive market prices (and hence over-consume), consumers may be 
better off.  Put more bluntly, consumer protection laws may better protect 
consumers by confusing or misleading them by allowing—or even 
dictating—tax-exclusive prices rather than prescribing clear and non-
 
 8. See infra note 36 and accompanying text.  
 9. See infra notes 18–21 and accompanying text; see also Council Directive 98/6, 
1998 O.J. (L 080) (EC) [hereinafter Directive 98/6].   
 10. See, e.g., Trade Practices Legislation Amendment Bill, No. 3 (2006) (Aus.); Trade 
Practices Amendment (Clarity in Pricing) (2008) (Aus.); see also proposed Canadian Bill 
No. 101, involving a reform of tax-inclusive pricing, available at 
http://www.assembly.pe.ca/bills/pdf_first/63/2/bill-101.pdf (last visited May 14, 2010). 
 11. See infra notes 27–29 and accompanying text. 
 12. See infra notes 31–32 and accompanying text. 
 13. See infra notes 32–33 and accompanying text. 
 14. See infra note 34 and accompanying text. 
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confusing tax-inclusive prices. 
The argument is built on an efficiency analysis of taxation.  
Deceiving consumers by making them perceive market prices of goods and 
services as if no taxes were imposed puts them in a situation similar to a no-
tax world, but where, in fact, they do pay taxes.  That is, by confusing 
consumers we can lure them to make choices as if no taxes existed, even 
though, ultimately, they actually pay taxes.  The social advantage of this 
kind of partially informed choice is the elimination (or restriction) of the 
welfare-reducing substitution effect due to taxes (although it may generate 
other welfare reducing effects).  Being unaware of taxes saves individuals 
from the distortive effect of taxation, which diminishes each individual’s 
utility and thus reduces social welfare. 
To be considered socially desirable, tax-inclusion regulation may 
therefore rest on a different rationale.  A few alternative rationales are 
suggested, of which only one seems to have a normative bite.  Only to the 
extent that commodity taxes are designed to achieve certain control of 
behavior (i.e., Pigouvian-like taxes) can tax-inclusive regulation be 
justified.  The justification, then, is more limited in scope than what might 
be initially believed, and, as this Article argues, is unrelated to consumer 
protection. 
Finally, this Article extends the analysis of “consumer confusion” 
in two ways.  First, this Article discusses potentially similar effects under 
income taxes.  For example, wages can be stated as inclusive or exclusive 
of wage taxes.  The tax-inclusive (that is, gross of tax) options in this case 
may confuse workers and affect choices over work and leisure (and hence 
consumption).  The second extension discusses potential market-based 
options that may improve social welfare, given the distortionary effect of 
taxes.  In particular, demand-increasing marketing strategies may create 
social value in a second-best optimal tax world. 
This Article is divided into six sections.  Section I presents the 
issue of price indication regulation, and in particular, its tax-inclusive 
pricing component.  It then discusses the suggested rationale of the 
regulation.  Section II introduces the basic efficiency analysis of taxation 
that serves as the basis for the main argument of this Article, which is 
presented in Section III.  Section III argues that the suggested justification 
for tax-inclusive pricing regulation is misconceived and may actually 
support tax-exclusive pricing.  Section IV considers other potential 
rationales for tax-inclusive pricing, and concludes generally that only 
Pigouvian tax schemes can support such price regulation, which in turn 
suggests that the scope of tax-inclusive pricing is more limited.  Section V 
offers a few extensions to the analysis of Sections II and III concerning 
income taxation and marketing strategies.  Section VI concludes. 
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I. PRICE INDICATION REGULATION AND TAX-INCLUSIVE PRICING 
A. Price Indication Regulation 
The stated goal of consumer protection laws is to protect consumers 
against deceptive, unfair, or fraudulent practices in the marketplace.15  A 
familiar component of consumer protection regulation is “price indication” 
rules.16  These rules typically specify the cost items that should be included 
in advertised prices, such as, costs of necessary packaging or delivery 
costs.17  The function of price indication rules is to provide consumers with 
full, accurate, and clear information of the full sale prices of goods.  The 
purpose, seemingly, is to diminish consumer confusion and improve 
consumer consumption choices.18  
Price indication regulation is prevalent in Europe.  In 1998, the 
E.C. promulgated a price indication directive that directed member states to 
adopt certain minimum price indication rules in their national consumer 
protection laws.19  A few European countries adopted price indication 
regulations in their consumer protection laws long before the E.C. directive 
was proposed, and other counties followed suit.20  Similar regulation is 
found in consumer protection laws (as well other laws) of non-European 
countries, such as New Zealand21 and Israel.22  Australia has been trying in 
recent years to amend its Trade Practices Act of 1974 in a similar manner.23 
This Article focuses on the tax component of price indication 
 
 15. See, e.g., Bureau of Consumer Protection, Federal Trade Commission, available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/about.shtm (last visited May 14, 2010).  
 16. See generally BRIAN W. HARVEY & DEBORAH L. PARRY, THE LAW OF CONSUMER 
PROTECTION AND FAIR TRADING 372–383 (4th ed. 1992). 
 17. See, e.g., Directive 98/6, supra note 9; Code of Practice for Traders on Price 
Indications, 1988, S.I. 1988/2078, Part 2, ¶ 2.2.4 (Eng.) [hereinafter Code of Practice for 
Traders]. 
 18. Directive 98/6, supra note 9, ¶¶ 1, 6. 
 19. Id. 
 20. See Hans Schulte-Nolke & Leonie Meyer-Schwickerath, Price Indication Directive 
(98/6), in EC CONSUMER LAW COMPENDIUM 581, 584 (2007).  In the U.K., for example, 
courts interpreted the Trade Description Act 1968 to require the inclusion of VAT and excise 
taxes in presented prices.  See, e.g., Richards v. Westminster Motors Ltd., R.T.R. (1976) 88 
(holding that the presentation of a minibus’s price, which excluded taxes, contravened 
existing law).  This interpretation was later made explicit by the Consumer Protection Act, 
1987 (Eng.) and the Code of Practice for Trader on Price Indications, supra note 17. 
 21. See, e.g., ALAN A. TAIT, VALUE-ADDED TAX:  INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE AND 
PROBLEMS 357 (Int’l Mon. Fund 1988). 
 22. See Consumer Protection Law, 5741–1981, 35 LSI 298 (1980–81) (Isr.). 
 23. See, e.g., Trade Practices Legislation Amendment Bill, supra note 10 (Aus.); Trade 
Practices Amendment, supra note 10 (Aus.). 
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regulations.  Typically, price indication regulations require that all taxes—
such as a sale tax or VAT—be included in the presented price.24  This is the 
rule, for example, in European countries and in several other countries, such 
as Israel and China.25  Canada has been considering tax-inclusive price 
presentation for more than a decade.26  Interestingly, in the U.S., no price 
indication regulation has been proposed and prices are tax-exclusive—that 
is, sales taxes are not included in presented prices.  The difference in 
consumer protection reactions between Europe and the U.S. is most likely 
due to substantial differences in consumption tax burdens.27  Consumption 
tax rates are much higher in European countries; VAT rates in Europe range 
from 7.6% (Switzerland) to 25% (Denmark, Norway, Sweden) with an 
average VAT rate of 19.5%,28 while the highest state sales tax rate in the 
U.S. only recently reached 8.25% (California).29  Additionally, the state 
sales tax base in the US is narrower than the typical European VAT base.  
Indeed, the tax inclusion issue is expected to become much more important 
for American consumers in the future.  First, sales taxes are generally 
rising.30  Second, and more significantly, a federal consumption tax—
whether in the form of national retail sales tax or national VAT—is being 
seriously considered in the U.S.  An academic preference for consumption 
 
 24. Directive 98/6, supra note 9, Art. 2. 
 25. For Israel, see Consumer Protection Law, supra note 22, §§ 17A, 17B.  
 26. In Canada, prices are tax-exclusive.  Since 1997, a Harmonized Sales Tax (HST) 
has been adopted in three Canadian provinces (Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Newfoundland 
and Labrador) as well as Quebec.  See http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca/tx/bsnss/tpcs/gst-
tps/gnrl/hw-eng.html (last visited May 14, 2010).  Under the HST, prices are supposed to 
include taxes.  However, this part of the HST has not yet come into effect.  In late 2008, 
Canadian Bill No. 101, supra note 10, was presented for consideration in Prince Edward 
Island; the Bill proposes a reform of tax-inclusive pricing. 
 27. For example, it can be argued that the difference is in the political reaction to the 
“fiscal illusion” effect.  Under the “fiscal illusion” hypothesis, individual voters may be 
unaware of the true tax burden if prices are presented inclusive of consumption taxes.  A 
lower tax rate (in the U.S.) may be more susceptible to the fiscal illusion effect then the 
European higher VAT rate.  See, e.g., Wallace E. Oates, On the ature and Measurement of 
Fiscal Illusion:  A Survey, in TAXATION AND FISCAL FEDERALISM:  ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF 
RUSSELL MATTHEWS 65, 67–68 (Geoffrey Brennan ed., Australian University Press 1988).  
See also infra notes 58–60 and accompanying text.   
 28. See Centre for Tax Policy and Administration, OECD Tax Database, Table IV.1, 
http://www.oecd.org/document/60/0,3343,en_2649_34533_1942460_1_1_1_1,00.html 
(follow “Table IV.1” hyperlink) (last visited May 14, 2010).  Rates are presented for 2007.  
See also Council Directive 2006/112, arts. 96, 97, 2006 O.J. (L 347) 1, 40 (EC) [hereinafter 
Council Directive 2006/112] (demonstrating the common system of value-added tax). 
 29. See The Tax Foundation, State Sales, Gasoline, Cigarette, and Alcohol Tax Rates 
by State, 2000–2009, http://www.taxfoundation.org/taxdata/show/245.html (last visited May 
14, 2010) [hereinafter State Sales].  Rates are presented for 2009. 
 30. Id. 
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tax base has been building for more than three decades.31  Government 
agencies have been attentive and devised several plans for the introduction 
of consumption taxes into the U.S. tax system.32  These proposals have been 
debated and scrutinized for quite some time now.33  Replacing the federal 
income tax system with a national retail sales tax would require a 
consumption tax rate in the range of 30%.34 
 
 31. The literature is voluminous.  See, e.g., NICHOLAS KALDOR, AN EXPENDITURE TAX 
(George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1955) (1958); ALAN J. AUERBACH & LAWRENCE J. KOTLIKOFF, 
DYNAMIC FISCAL POLICY 55–87 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1987); David Bradford, The Case 
for a Personal Consumption Tax, in WHAT SHOULD BE TAXED:  INCOME OR EXPENDITURE? A 
REPORT OF A CONFERENCE SPONSORED BY THE FUND FOR PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH AND THE 
BROOKINGS INSTITUTION 75, 75–110 (Joseph A. Pechman ed., 1980); William Andrews, A 
Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1113 (1974); 
Michael Graetz, Implementing a Progressive Consumption Tax, 92 HARV. L. REV 1575 
(1979); Alvin Warren, Would a Consumption Tax Be Fairer than an Income Tax?, 89 YALE 
L. J. 1081 (1980); ROBERT E. HALL & ALVIN RABUSHKA, THE FLAT TAX (Hoover Inst. Press 
2d ed. 1995); Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Is the Debate Between an Income Tax 
and a Consumption Tax a Debate About Risk?  Does It Matter?, 47 TAX L. REV. 377 (1992); 
Barbara H. Fried, Fairness and the Consumption Tax, 44 STAN. L. REV. 961 (1992); John K. 
McNulty, Flat Tax, Consumption Tax, Consumption-Type Proposals in the United States:  A 
Tax Policy Discussion of Fundamental Tax Reform, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2095, 2117–2125 
(2000); David Bradford, A Tax System for the Twenty-First Century, in TOWARD 
FUNDAMENTAL TAX REFORM 1 (Alan J. Auerbach & Kevin A. Hassett eds., AEI Press 2005); 
Michael J. Graetz, 100 Million Unnecessary Returns:  A Fresh Start for the U.S. Tax System, 
112 YALE L .J. 261 (2002); Edward J. McCaffery, A ew Understanding of Tax, 103 MICH 
L. REV. 807 (2005); Joseph Bankman & David A. Weisbach, The Superiority of an Ideal 
Consumption Tax over an Ideal Income Tax, 58 STAN L. REV 1413 (2006); Daniel Shaviro, 
Beyond the Pro-Consumption Tax Consensus, 60 STAN L. REV 745 (2007). 
 32. See, e.g., DAVID F. BRADFORD & THE U.S. TREASURY TAX POLICY STAFF, 
BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX REFORM (Tax Analysts 2d ed. 1984); GREGG A. ESENWEIN & 
JANE G. GRAVELLE, THE FLAT TAX, VALUE-ADDED TAX, AND NATIONAL RETAIL SALES TAX:  
OVERVIEW OF THE ISSUES (Cong. Res. Rep., Libr. of Cong. 2004) (discussing the 
consumption tax base option for the U.S.); JANE G. GRAVELLE, THE ADVISORY PANEL’S TAX 
REFORM PROPOSALS (Cong. Res. Rep., Libr. of Cong. 2006) (same); see also a list of 
legislative proposals in JAMES M. BICKLEY, A VALUE-ADDED TAX CONTRASTED WITH A 
NATIONAL SALES TAX 4–6 (Cong. Res. Rep., Libr. of Cong. 2004). 
 33. See, e.g., John L. Mikesell, The American Retail Sales Tax: Considerations on 
Their Structure, Operations, and Potential as a Foundation for a Federal Sales Tax, 50 
NAT’L TAX JOURNAL 149 (1997) (discussing the consumption tax base option for the U.S.); 
John Buckley & Diane Lim Rogers, Is a ational Retail Sales Tax in Our Future? 104 TAX 
NOTES 1277 (Sept. 13, 2004) (same). 
 34. See, e.g., William G. Gale, The Required Tax Rate in a ational Retail Sales Tax, 
52 NAT’L TAX J. 443, 455–56 (1999) (arguing that required tax-inclusive rate would be over 
50% and the required tax-exclusive rate would be over 100%); William G. Gale, The 
ational Retail Sales Tax:  What Would the Rate Have To Be?, 107 TAX NOTES 889, 896, 
898–99 (May 16, 2005) (estimating consumption tax rates much higher than 30%); Charles 
McLure, Testimony Before the President’s Advisory Panel on Tax Reform (2005), available 
at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/taxreformpanel/meetings/meeting-05_11-12_2005.html (last 
visited May 14, 2010).  A choice of mixed income and consumption tax bases would permit 
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B. Justifying Tax-Inclusive Regulation 
There is no clear indication of the rationales for tax-inclusion 
regulation.  The E.U. Directive, for example, indicates that price indication 
is required in order to assure precise, transparent, and unambiguous 
information for consumers concerning prices.35  The rationale for price 
indication regulation seemingly falls squarely within the general purpose of 
consumer protection laws.  If prices of goods and services are not presented 
clearly and do not include all necessary expenses incurred by consumers 
who purchase goods or services, consumers may be confused or misled.  In 
particular, in the tax inclusion case, consumers may perceive the price to be 
lower than the actual cost, because they do not consider non-stated (or 
separately stated) taxes.  That is, consumers may tend to purchase more 
than they would have if prices were clearly stated and all relevant taxes 
were included.36  As a result, consumers purchase goods and services even 
where the marginal benefit from such a purchase is lower than the marginal 
cost.  This confusion diminishes consumer utility, which, in turn, 
diminishes social welfare.  A preventive regulatory measure in the form of 
price indication supposedly eliminates this confusion and is thus welfare-
increasing  
The necessary condition for price indication regulation is, thus, that 
consumers are confused in a particular manner—i.e., they under-value the 
real price.  It is not entirely clear that consumers indeed under-value the 
prices of goods and services if prices are not stated clearly.  This is an 
informational problem facing consumers.  Consumers may not possess the 
required complete information about purchase prices (and taxes), or may 
                                                                                                                 
a lower consumption tax rate. 
 35. See, e.g., Directive 98/6, supra note 9. 
 36. Additional support for such anticipated consumer confusion can be derived from 
the consistent objections of retailers and producers to tax-inclusive pricing initiatives.  
(Formally, retailers and producers argue that implementing tax-inclusive pricing is more 
costly.)  See, e.g., JOHN F. DUE & JOHN L. MIKESELL, SALES TAXATION: STATE AND LOCAL 
STRUCTURE AND ADMINISTRATION 30–31 (Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 2d ed. 1994); Raj 
Chetty et al., Salience and Taxation: Theory and Evidence, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 1145, 1150 
(2009) (reporting that managers of a large California grocery chain expected tax-inclusive 
prices to reduce sales).  Consider also retailer opposition to Canadian Bill No. 101 (Can.), 
supra note 10; see, e.g., Submission by the Retail Council of Canada to the Prince Edward 
Island Standing Committee on Community Affairs and Economic Development: Review of 





&gl=us (last visited May 14, 2010). 
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not adequately process the information they have gathered.  Gathering and 
processing information are costly undertakings in terms of effort, time, and 
money.  For example, under a tax-exclusive price system, a consumer may 
not know the exact sales tax or value-added tax that applies to a good she 
intends to buy;37 or, even if she knows the applicable tax rate, she may not 
calculate the tax-inclusive price correctly or may be reluctant to make any 
calculations.  The lack of price information  confuses consumers; as a 
result, consumers may make mistakes. 
Yet, it is not necessarily correct that consumers will always be 
mistaken in a specific manner—by under-valuing prices.  The lack of 
complete and fully processed information about prices may lead to over-
estimation, or, on average, to accurate estimations, rather than under-
valuation of prices.  Facing uncertainty about (tax-inclusive) prices, 
individuals are not necessarily expected to under-estimate real prices.  In 
particular, risk-averse individuals are expected to over-value uncertain tax 
burdens or uncertain tax-inclusive prices.38 
An additional explanatory component is required to make the 
under-valuation prediction (i.e., a biased mistake) theoretically valid.  One 
must explain why consumers tend to under-value prices in the face of 
uncertain pricing.  Why are consumers unaware of their under-valuation 
mistakes and why do consumers not learn or de-bias themselves over time?  
In the tax context, it should be made clear why we should not expect 
consumers to be aware that, or to learn why, under a tax-exclusive price 
system, total prices are actually higher. 
It seems that the most promising theoretical venue for a “consumer 
under-valuation” hypothesis is cognitive biases and errors.  A growing 
psychological and behavioral economics literature investigates human 
cognitive limitations and heuristics, and shows how they affect individual 
choices in the marketplace.39  Various kinds of biases and heuristics are 
 
 37. At least in one field experiment, however, consumers demonstrated rather accurate 
knowledge of non-indicated sales taxes.  See generally Chetty et al., supra note 36. 
 38. Indeed, it should be clear that tax-inclusion regulation cannot be about 
uncertainty—i.e., consumers being uncertain of exact taxes.  Had risk-averse consumers 
faced uncertain total prices, they would have purchased less rather than more, compared 
with a situation in which they had full information.  Sellers, then, would have had strong 
incentives to reduce uncertainty.  No regulatory intervention would have been required.  
Similarly, such regulation does not target a reduction in information costs—i.e., arguably, 
gathering, processing, and distributing information is cheaper for producers/retailers than for 
consumers due to economies of scale.  Where retailers/producers can save costs for 
consumers, they have a strong profit-maximizing incentive to do so, as it provides them with 
competitive advantage.  Again, regulation would not be required. 
 39. The psychological and behavioral economics literature is vast.  See generally, e.g., 
ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS (Colin Camerer et al. eds., 2004). 
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revealed on the basis of experiments, many of which can be suggested as a 
source of consumer biases in evaluation of prices or demand for goods, 
given any amount of available information.  These biases may theoretically 
explain why consumers do not rationally optimize their choices, and in 
particular, why consumers tend to under-value prices in certain situations 
regardless of available information.  The following discussion presents a 
few examples of cognitive biases that might explain consumer under-
evaluation of tax-exclusive prices.  The presentation or framing of prices 
and costs may affect individual decisions.40  Excluded consumption taxes 
may be less visible, salient, available, or accessible,41 and thus are ignored, 
to a certain extent, in making choices.42  Individuals may present limited 
attention to available information.43  Also related is anchoring bias, which 
describes the tendency to anchor evaluation to a starting point and a 
subsequent failure to adjust appropriately, making the estimation biased 
towards the anchor.44  A tax-exclusive price may function as such an 
anchor, and consumers may fail to adjust to imposed taxes.  Mental 
accounting may posit a claim for mental separation between prices and 
additional taxes in consumption decision-making.45  Partitioning a single 
 
 40. See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the 
Rationality of Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453, 454–58 (1981); Amos Tversky & Daniel 
Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions, 59 J. OF BUSINESS S251, S257–
71, S272–73 (1986) (challenging the rational account of human behavior). 
 41. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman, Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for 
Behavioral Economics, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 1449 (2003) (discussing the effects of saliency 
and accessibility on behavior). 
 42. See Amy Finkelstein, E-ZTax:  Tax Salience and Tax Rates (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 12924, 2007); Edward J. McCaffery & Jonathan Baron, 
Thinking About Tax, 12 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 106, 108–127 (2006) (making the case for 
an isolation effect being a central cognitive bias) [hereinafter McCaffery & Baron, Thinking 
About Tax].  But cf. George Loewensteint & Ted O’Donoghuett, “We Can Do This the Easy 
Way or the Hard Way”:  egative Emotions, Self-Regulation, and the Law, 73 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 183, 199 (2006) (arguing that non-salient taxes may be preferable since they save 
taxpayers the psychic costs of paying taxes). 
 43. See, e.g., Stefano DellaVigna, Psychology and Economics:  Evidence from the 
Field, 47 J. ECON. LITERATURE 315, 348–53 (2009).  Indeed, inattention may be considered 
rational—that is, as a rational response to the costly gathering and processing of information.  
Chetty et al., supra note 36, at 1165–66; see also Raj Chetty, Adam Looney & Kory Kroft, 
Salience and Taxation: Theory and Evidence 28–35 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ Research, 
Working Paper No. 13330, 2007), available at 
http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/Intellectual_Life/07_LEO_Salience_and_Taxation.
pdf (last visited May 14, 2010). 
 44. See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment under Uncertainty:  
Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124, 1128–30 (1974) (discussing the anchoring bias); 
Gretchen B. Chapman & Eric J. Johnson, Incorporating the Irrelevant: Anchors in 
Judgments of Belief and Value, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES 120, 120–23 (Thomas Gilovich et 
al. eds., 2002) (same). 
 45. See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Choices, Values, and Frames, 39 
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cost into multiple smaller amounts—such as dividing the tax-inclusive price 
into a tax-exclusive price plus tax—may drive individuals to under-value 
the actual cost.46  Individuals also tend to be tenaciously optimistic,47 which 
can imply that consumers may be optimistic about the burden of unknown 
tax costs.48 
More than thirty years into behavioral economic research, it seems 
that there is almost no irrational behavior that cannot be theoretically 
explained by certain recognized psychological phenomena.  But, such 
cognitive limitations function differently in different situations, and short of 
empirical evidence, there is no guarantee that any of the suggested biases 
provides an explanation for consumer under-valuation of tax-exclusive 
prices. 
Recent public economics research examined potential 
misperceptions and biases in the tax sphere.49  Experiments reveal various 
biases concerning taxes.  For example, taxpayers react to tax salience;50 
                                                                                                                 
AM.PSYCHOL. 341, 346–48 (1984); Richard Thaler, Mental Accounting Matters, 12 J. OF 
BEHAVIORAL DECISION MAKING 183, 188–203 (1999) (explaining the mental accounting 
heuristic and presenting evidence of its effect). 
 46. See generally, e.g., Edward J. McCaffery & Jonathan Baron, The Humpty Dumpty 
Blues:  Disaggregation Bias in The Evaluation of Tax Systems, 91 ORG. BEHAVIOR AND 
HUMAN DECISION PROCESSES 230 (2003) (discussing instances of disaggregation bias in tax 
law) [hereinafter McCaffery & Baron, Humpty Dumpty Blues]; see also infra notes 69–77 
and accompanying text.  
 47. See, e.g., David A. Armor & Shelley E. Taylor, When Predictions Fail:  The 
Dilemma of Unrealistic Optimism, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES 334, 334–36 (Thomas 
Gilovich et al. eds., 2002) (reviewing and discussing the optimism bias). 
 48. Yet because over-optimism generally stems from a propensity to use past 
experience to evaluate future events—see id. at 338—one might expect that consumers 
would learn quickly, over multiple market transactions, that consumption taxes are 
additionally imposed. 
 49. See, e.g., Edward J. McCaffery, Cognitive Theory and Tax, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1861 
(1994) (surveying a range of heuristics and biases in evaluating taxes) [hereinafter 
McCaffery, Cognitive Theory]; McCaffery & Baron, Thinking About Tax, supra note 42 
(same); Edward J. McCaffery & Jonathan Baron, The Political Psychology of Redistribution, 
52 UCLA L. REV. 1745 (2005) (same); Edward J. McCaffery & Joel Slemrod, Toward an 
Agenda for Behavioral Public Finance, in BEHAVIORAL PUBLIC FINANCE 3 et seq. (Edward 
McCaffery & Joel Slemrod eds., 2006) (same); Aradhna Krishna & Joel Slemrod, 
Behavioral Public Finance: Tax  Design as Price Presentation, 10 INT’L TAX AND PUB. FIN. 
189 (2003) (discussing various kinds of misperceptions resulting from presentation 
manipulation); Leonard Burman & Mohammed Adeel Saleem, Hidden Taxes and Subsidies, 
100 TAX NOTES 1437 (September 15, 2003) (discussing and presenting tax rules that 
translate into tax rates); Jeffrey B. Liebman & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Schmeduling (2004) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with Harvard University) (suggesting two biases—
spotlighting and ironing—that affect reactions to taxes); Brian Galle, Hidden Taxes (2009) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (surveying potential effects of non-salient 
taxes). 
 50. See generally Rupert Sausgruber & Jean-Robert Tyran, Tax Salience, Voting and 
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individuals perceive equivalent direct and indirect taxes differently;51 
individuals misperceive the distributional effects of tax systems,52 and the 
progressivity of disaggregated tax schemes;53 framing and labeling taxes 
affects taxpayer reaction;54 taxpayers misperceive tax liabilities;55 
individuals confuse marginal tax rates with average tax rates;56 and tax 
                                                                                                                 
Deliberation (Discussion Paper No. 08-21, Department of Economics, University of 
Copenhagen, 2008), available at http://econpapers.repec.org/paper/kudkuiedp/0821.htm (last 
visited May 14, 2010) (showing that tax salience affects buyers’ choice between buyer and 
seller taxes); Edward J. McCaffery & Jonathan Baron, Isolation Effects and the eglect of 
Indirect Effects of Fiscal Policies, 19 J. BEHAVIORAL DECISION MAKING 289 (2006) (arguing 
that hidden taxes are preferred over transparent taxes). 
 51. Rupert Sausgruber & Jean-Robert Tyran, Testing the Mill Hypothesis of Fiscal 
Illusion, 122 PUBLIC CHOICE 39, 41–54 (2004) (showing that the burden of less visible taxes 
is underestimated); Tomer Blumkin et al., Are Income and Consumption Taxes Ever Realty 
Equivalent? Evidence from a Real-Effort Experiment with Real Goods (CESifo Working 
Paper No. 2194, 2008), available at http://www.cesifo.de/DocCIDL/cesifo1_wp2194.pdf 
(last visited May 14, 2010) (observing that individuals make different work-leisure choices 
when they face equivalent direct and indirect taxes). 
 52. See generally Joel Slemrod, The Role of Misconceptions in Support for Regressive 
Tax Reform, 59 NAT’L TAX J. 57 (2006) (presenting evidence of public misconception that 
high-income individuals will pay more taxes under a regressive tax system), available at 
http://ntj.tax.org/wwtax/ntjrec.nsf/B217DBA3D2128D018525715E00592788/$FILE/Article
%2003-Slemrod.pdf (last visited May 14, 2010).  
 53. McCaffery & Baron, Humpty Dumpty Blues, supra note 46 (showing that people 
evaluate aggregated and disaggregated income tax schedules differently). 
 54. McCaffery & Baron, Thinking About Tax, supra note 42, at 117–19 (arguing that 
labeling equivalent levies as “tax” or “payment” affect individual choices); see also 
generally Asa Lofgren & Katarina Nordblom, Puzzling Tax Attitudes and Labels, 16 
APPLIED ECON. LETTERS 1809 (2009) (labeling a gasoline tax as a carbon dioxide tax 
diminishes individuals’ unfavorable view of the tax); Edward J. McCaffery & Jonathan 
Baron, Framing and Taxation:  Evaluation of Tax Policies Involving Household 
Composition, 25 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 679 (2004) (suggesting that the framing of tax issues 
affects individual choices); Catherine C. Eckel et al., An Experimental Test of the Crowding 
Out Hypothesis, 89 J. PUB. ECON. 1543 (2005) (framing public transfers to charities as forced 
contributions crowds out private giving); Steffen Kallbekken & Stephan Kroll, Do You Not 
Like Pigou, or Do You Not Understand Him? Tax Aversion in the Lab (2007) (working 
paper) (on file with author) (studying experimentally the effect on voters of labeling an 
environmental levy as a tax); Kilian Bizer, Framing Effects in Taxation:  An Empirical Study 
Using the German Income Tax Schedule, 16 EUR. J. POL. ECON. 843 (2000) (book review) 
(book author Stefan Traub experimentally examines the framing effect of child tax credits in 
Germany). 
 55. Norman Gemmell et al., Tax Perceptions and Preferences over Tax Structure in the 
United Kingdom, 114 ECON. J. F117, F118–24 (2004). 
 56. Liebman & Zeckhauser, supra note 49, at 15 (analyzing the welfare effects of such 
confusion); Naomi E. Feldman & Peter Katuscak, Should the Average Tax Rate Be 
Marginalized? (CERGE-EI Working Paper Series 304, 2006), available at 
http://ideas.repec.org/p/cer/papers/wp304.html (last visited May 14, 2010) (presenting 
empirical support). 
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incidence becomes dependent on statutory incidence.57 
Unfortunately, however, to date, there is little empirical support for 
consumer under-valuation of tax-exclusive prices.  One source that may 
provide indirect support is the “fiscal illusion” literature.  The “fiscal 
illusion” hypothesis states that voters systematically misperceive fiscal 
factors that may significantly alter their fiscal choices; in particular, voters 
under-estimate their tax burden.58  Yet, empirical evidence of the fiscal 
illusion hypothesis is inconclusive.59  Furthermore, the exclusion of taxes 
from prices is actually considered as a de-biasing mechanism for fiscally 
delusional taxpayers.60 
Alternatively, support for a “consumer under-valuation” hypothesis 
can be potentially drawn from a growing amount of empirical evidence on 
price presentation.61  These studies examine consumer behavioral effects—
i.e., demand for goods—due to price presentation manipulation.62  
Designing price presentation can affect consumer perception of value and 
cost—in particular, due to framing effects and hence (increase) their 
demand for products, while prices do not change.63  Although unrelated to 
taxes, these studies may provide indirect support for the effect of tax-
exclusive presentation on taxpayers.64  For example, reference prices (that 
 
 57. See generally Rudolf Kerschbamer & Georg Kirchsteiger, Theoretically Robust but 
Empirically Invalid? An Experimental Investigation into Tax Equivalence, 16 ECON. THEORY 
719 (2000).  Cf. Rainald Borck et al., Tax Liability Side Equivalence in experimental Posted 
Offer Markets, 68 S. ECON. J. 672, 672 (2002); Arno Riedl & Jean-Robert Tyran, Tax 
Liability Side Equivalence in Gift-Exchange Labor Markets, 89 J. OF PUB. ECON. 2369, 2369 
(2005). 
 58. See BUCHANAN, supra note 4, at 126–43. 
 59. The fiscal illusion literature is voluminous.  See, e.g., Wallace E. Oates, On the 
ature and Measurement of the Fiscal Illusion:  A Survey, in STUDIES IN FISCAL FEDERALISM 
441 (W.E. Oates ed., Edward Elgar 1991) (discussing the different versions of the fiscal 
illusion hypothesis and examining empirical studies); Brain E. Dollery & Andrew C. 
Worthington, The Empirical Analysis of Fiscal Illusion, 10 J. OF ECON. SURV. 261, 261 
(1996) (same).  A related hypothesis is the “flypaper effect,” and its empirical validity is 
similarly inconclusive.  Compare James R. Hines, Jr. & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies:  The 
Flypaper Effect, 9 J. OF ECON. PERSP. 217 (1995), with Elizabeth Becker, The Illusion of 
Fiscal Illusion:  Unsticking the Flypaper Effect, 86 PUB. CHOICE 85 (1996). 
 60. See infra Section VI for further discussion. 
 61. For review and analysis of various studies, see Aradhna Krishna et al., A Meta-
Analysis of the Impact of Price Presentation on Perceived Savings, 78 J. OF RETAILING 101 
(2002); Maggie Wenjing Liu & Dilip Soman, Behavioral Pricing, in HANDBOOK OF 
CONSUMER PSYCHOLOGY 659 (Curtis P. Haugtvedt, Paul M. Herr & Frank R. Kardes eds., 
2008). 
 62. See, e.g., Krishna et al., supra note 61, at 101–03; Liu & Soman, supra note 61, at 
672–76.  
 63. Krishna et al., supra note 61, at 106–09. 
 64. Krishna & Slemrod, supra note 49, originally introduced price presentation 
research into tax.  
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is, the use of consumers of a certain standard or reference point to evaluate 
purchase prices) influence consumers’ decisions.65  Accordingly, one may 
conjecture that lower, tax-exclusive prices may be evaluated more 
positively by consumers when compared to any reference point.  Another 
example is different forms of variation in prices.  Varying prices in absolute 
dollar amounts or percentage points affects consumers’ perception 
differently.66  It may teach us how ad valorem commodity taxes, which 
function as a percentage increase in price, would affect consumers when 
added to tax-exclusive prices.  Another piece of indirect evidence comes 
from a study of the effect of vehicle personal property taxes (VPPT) on 
individuals’ decisions to buy/replace a car.67  Based on a mail 
questionnaire, this study argues that the VPPT plays a weak role in car-
buying decisions, and conjectures that either price partition or mental 
accounting are the behavioral reason for this outcome.68 
Yet, the most relevant strand of price presentation studies are of 
price partitioning—i.e., presenting the price as a set of mandatory 
surcharges rather than one all-inclusive price.69  Aggregating and 
disaggregating final prices affect consumers’ choices.70  The theoretical 
 
 65. See, e.g., Richard Thaler, Mental Accounting and Consumer Choice, 4 MARKETING 
SCI. 199, 204 (1985) (modeling the effect of reference prices through the use of prospect 
theory) [hereinafter Thaler, Mental Accounting and Consumer Choice]; Russell S. Winer, 
Behavioral Perspectives on Pricing:  Buyers’ Subjective Perception of Price Revisited, in 
ISSUES IN PRICING:  THEORY AND RESEARCH 35, 35–37 (Timothy M. Devinney ed., 1988); 
Daniel S. Putler, Incorporating Reference Price Effects into a Theory of Consumer Choice, 
11 MARKETING SCI. 287, 287 (1992) (modeling reference price formation within consumer 
choice theory and studying it empirically); Richard A. Briesch et al., A Comparative 
Analysis of Reference Price Models, 24 J. OF CONSUMER RES. 202, 202 (1997) (testing 
empirically several theoretical explanation for the effect of reference price). 
 66. See, e.g., Vicki G. Morwitz et al., Divide and Prosper:  Consumers’ Reactions to 
Partitioned Prices, 35 J. MARKETING RES. 453, 456 (1998) (presenting experimental 
evidence of more accurate reaction to additions of absolute amount to price than percentage 
additions) [hereinafter Morwitz et al., Divide and Prosper]; Shih-Fen S. Chen et al., The 
Effects of Framing Price Promotion Messages on Consumers’ Perceptions and Purchase 
Intentions:  Research Perspectives on Retail Pricing, 74 J. RETAILING 353, 355 (1998) 
(showing experimentally how different presentations of price reductions affect choices). 
 67. Richard L. Ott & David M. Andrus, The Effect of Personal Property Taxes on 
Consumer Vehicle-Purchasing Decisions:  A Partitioned Price/Mental Accounting Theory 
Analysis, 28 PUB. FIN. REV. 134, 134 (2000). 
 68. Id. at 138–39. 
 69. Marco Bertini & Luc Wathieu, Attention Arousal Through Price Partitioning, 27 
MARKETING SCI. 236, 236 (2008). 
 70. See, e.g., Thaler, Mental Accounting and Consumer Choice, supra note 65, at 208–
13 (suggesting on the basis of prospect theory that price aggregation and disaggregation 
affect consumers’ perceptions and decisions); Timothy B. Heath et al., Mental Accounting 
and Changes in Price:  The Frame Dependence of Reference Dependence, 22 J. CONSUMER 
RES. 90 (1995) (testing experimentally the mental accounting hypothesis for various price 
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source of the integration/partition effect can be found in either consumers’ 
mental accounting,71 or in anchoring effect and costly adjustments.72  
Among the price partitioning studies, particularly interesting are those that 
examine the effect of disaggregation of surcharges—such as shipping and 
handling, additional components, and warranty.73  It turns out that in wide 
range of cases partitioning surcharges increase consumers’ demand.74  
Actually, one study experimentally examined reaction to partition of sales 
taxes and found similar results—that is, partitioning prices and sales tax 
does not decrease demand.75 
Additional direct support  for under-valuation of tax-exclusive 
prices comes from one recent study by Chetty et al.76  Chetty et al. 
                                                                                                                 
change strategies). 
 71. See, e.g., Thaler, Mental Accounting and Consumer Choice, supra note 65, at 201–
04 (introducing mental accounting into consumer choice modeling and suggesting 
implication for pricing strategies); see also generally Hyeong Min Kim & Luke Kachersky, 
Dimensions of Price Salience: A Conceptual Framework for Perceptions of Multi-
Dimensional Prices, 15 J. PRODUCT & BRAND MGMT. 139 (2006) (conjecturing different 
forms and effects of price salience).  
 72. See Manoj Thomas & Vicki Morwitz, Heuristics in Numerical Cognition: 
Implications for Pricing (Nov. 13, 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) 
(discussing several heuristics that apply to price presentation). 
 73. See, e.g., Tanjim Hossain & John Morgan, ...Plus Shipping and Handling: Revenue 
(on) Equivalence in Field Experiments on eBay, 6 ADVANCES IN ECON. ANALYSIS & POL’Y 
Art. 3 (2006) (presenting experimental evidence of increased demand in reaction to 
disaggregation of shipping and handling costs of goods on eBay); Morwitz et al., Divide and 
Prosper, supra note 66, at 454–61 (presenting experimental evidence of increased demand in 
reaction to price partitioning); Dipankar Chakravarti et al., Partitioned Presentation of 
Multicomponent Bundle Prices:  Evaluation, Choice and Underlying Processing Effects, 12 
J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 215 (2002) (showing experimentally that demand for a good 
increases upon disaggregation of the price of a warranty and additional components of the 
good).  However, the demand-increasing effect of price partition is not conclusive.  See 
generally, e.g., Hyeong Min Kim, The Effect of Salience on Mental Accounting:  How 
Integration Versus Segregation of Payment Influences Purchase Decisions, 19 J. BEHAV. 
DECISION MAKING 381 (2006) (showing that price partitioning diminishes demand when 
price components are salient); Bertini & Wathieu, supra note 69 (showing that price 
partitioning increases consumer attention to product attributes). 
 74. See Hossain & Morgan, supra note 73, at 24–25; Morwitz et al., Divide and 
Prosper, supra note 66, at 460–62; Chakravarti et al., supra note 73, at 225–26.  But see 
Kim, supra note 73, at 387–88 (showing that price partitioning diminishes demand when 
price components are salient); cf. Bertini & Wathieu, supra note 69, at 244–45 (showing that 
price partitioning increases consumer attention to, and thus valuation of, product attributes). 
 75. See Lan Xia & Kent B. Monroe, Price Partitioning on the Internet, 18 J. 
INTERACTIVE MARKETING 63, 65–68 (2004). 
 76. Chetty et al., supra note 36 (showing that tax salience affects the demand for 
grocery products).  Another relevant empirical study is presented in Finkelstein, supra note 
42.  Finkelstein shows that paying road tolls electronically, rather than in cash, which 
arguably make tolls less salient, diminishes sensitivity to tolls.  Yet, surveying drivers 
indicates that they overestimate the non-salient road tolls. 
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attempted to empirically examine consumer differential reaction to tax-
exclusive and tax-inclusive prices.  They conducted a field experiment, 
under which prices of a limited set of products in a Northern California 
grocery store were presented both exclusive and inclusive of sales tax over 
three weeks (while prices are, in general, tax-exclusive).  Consumers 
reacted to the price partitioning and purchased less when the product price 
included sales tax.77 
Notwithstanding limited empirical support, this Article adopts the 
prediction that consumers will under-value tax-exclusive prices, because, as 
explained in this section, this is the essential presumption of price 
indication regulation.  Although the author does not necessarily subscribe to 
this view, consumers’ biased price evaluation is necessary for price 
indication regulation.  Hence, it is assumed here that in the absence of such 
regulation, consumers will over-consume.  This Article argues that such 
price under-estimation and resulting over-consumption can actually be 
welfare-increasing.  That is, to the extent consumers are indeed confused 
and misled by tax-exclusive prices and cannot de-bias themselves, they can 
be better off.  In order to appreciate this argument, let us briefly review the 
efficiency analysis of taxes. 
II. TAXATION AND EFFICIENCY 
Taxes generate inefficiency (or excess burden); that is, they 
diminish individual utility by inducing a change in individual behavior.78  
When individuals are induced to act differently than they would have in a 
no-tax world, they are not as well off as before.  Assuming that individuals 
optimize their behavior when no taxes exist, any deviation from this 
behavior due to government intervention must be utility-reducing.  For 
example, income taxation typically induces individuals to work less then 
they would have had no such taxes been imposed.79 
For analytical reasons, economists break up individual reaction to 
 
 77. The results of this study are presumably sensitive to its design.  First, the study was 
conducted in a “tax-exclusive environment.”  That is, U.S. consumers are used to tax-
exclusive price presentation and may have been confused by the mere change in the 
environment rather than the form of price presentation.  Second, the study was conducted 
over a limited set of products, and in particular, over a limited period of time.  These facts 
exacerbate the mentioned effect.  Overall, Chetty et al. might have only measured a “shock” 
effect or the reaction of consumers to new transaction costs in analyzing a new pricing 
system. 
 78. HARVEY S. ROSEN, PUBLIC FINANCE 304–24 (7th ed. 2005); JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, 
ECONOMICS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR 518–47 (3d ed. 1999). 
 79. ROSEN, supra note 78, at 402–05; STIGLITZ, supra note 78, at 535–47. 
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taxes (or price changes, in general) into two components, denoted as an 
“income effect” and a “substitution effect.”80  The income effect represents 
the change in taxpayer behavior solely due to the change in wealth.81  Tax 
payments reduce taxpayer wealth, which in turn, induces taxpayers to act 
differently.  For example, lower-wealth individuals may forego luxuries, or 
exchange expensive forms of behavior (such as vacationing in the 
Caribbean) with cheaper substitutes (such as a vacation at home); lower-
wealth individuals may also increase their labor effort to (partially) make 
up for the loss of wealth.  The income effect is inevitable.  If taxes are to be 
collected from individuals, their wealth must correspondingly decrease.82  
There is nothing individuals can do to avoid incurring the reduction in 
wealth due to tax payments.  Because (i) any tax payment of a certain 
amount generates an identical income effect—that is, reduces taxpayer 
wealth identically, and (ii) the reduction in taxpayer wealth corresponds to 
an increase in public revenue, the income effect is ignored in the social 
welfare (or efficiency) analysis.83  Put differently, the excess burden—i.e., 
reduction in social welfare—due to the income effect is nil, or at least 
identical for equal-revenue taxes, and hence uninteresting in the analysis of 
various tax schemes.  Note that this is not to say that the mere payment of 
any tax is not welfare reducing for taxpayers.  It is.  But it can be ignored in 
a revenue-neutral analysis for the above reasons.84 
The substitution effect, on the other hand, is designable.  The 
substitution effect describes changes in taxpayer behavior due to changes in 
relative prices.85  Taxes may change relative prices—or, in other words, the 
relative attractiveness—of different activities and modes of behavior.  
Individuals react to such changes by moving away from relatively 
expensive activities toward relatively cheaper modes of behavior.86  In the 
case of income taxation, for example, higher taxes on wages would induce 
 
 80. See, e.g., HAL R. VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 119–22, 160–63 (3d ed. 
1992); ROSEN, supra note 78, at 311–12. 
 81. Economists measure the monetary consequence of the income effect to individual 
utility by the “equivalent variation.”  See VARIAN, supra note 80, at 160–63; ROSEN, supra 
note 78, at 307. 
 82. This paper ignores the expenditure side of the state—i.e., benefits individuals 
receive from the government. 
 83. STIGLITZ, supra note 78, at 520–22. 
 84. Furthermore, the individual change in behavior described by the income effect is 
actually welfare-increasing, given the reduction in personal wealth due to tax payments.  
That is, if individuals did not change their choices due to a reduction in their available 
resources, they would be worse off (again, given a certain tax obligation). See infra note 104 
and accompanying text. 
 85. STIGLITZ, supra note 78, at 520–21. 
 86. Id. 
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individuals, inter alia, to work less and consume more leisure.87  The 
relative prices of effort (work) and leisure change due to wage taxes.88  
Property taxes, as another example, increase the price of housing and hence 
make consumption of housing services less attractive.89  Individuals react 
by partially substituting housing consumption (for example, smaller and 
lower quality apartments) with other kinds of consumption or with leisure.90  
This tax-induced change in behavior is also welfare-reducing; individuals 
act differently than their optimal choice due to taxes. 
Various equal-revenue taxes may cause different substitution 
effects.  The extent to which individuals change their behavior through 
substitution in reaction to taxes—and accordingly the extent to which their 
utility is diminished—is not identical for different equal-revenue taxes.91  
The substitution effect of diverse equal-revenue taxes differently affects 
social welfare.  Thus, the social engineering task—to the extent that 
efficiency is important—is to design taxes so that the substitution effect is 
minimized. 
Economists denote the perfectly-efficient tax measure as a “lump-
sum tax” or first-best optimal tax.92  A lump-sum tax is defined as a tax 
measure that does not generate a substitution effect.93  The only induced 
change in individual behavior under a lump-sum tax is due to the 
diminution of wealth—that is, an income effect.94  A typical—though not 
perfect—example is a head tax that does not change the relative prices of 
any activities (besides immigrating and dying).  That is, individuals cannot 
change their behavior or choice of activities in order to reduce the head tax 
burden.  Nothing they do (again, besides immigrating or dying) will change 
their tax liability. 
But, adopting a lump-sum tax is considered socially undesirable 
since it is insensitive to distributional concerns.  Individuals with different 
characteristics, which are considered relevant distributional concerns (such 
as income, wealth, consumption, health), may bear equal tax burdens under 
a lump sum tax system.95  Thus, imperfectly efficient tax—denoted as the 
second-best optimal tax96—is sought.  Income and consumption tax bases, 
 
 87. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.  
 88. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
 89. ROSEN, supra note 78, at 521–30. 
 90. Id. at 525–27. 
 91. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
 92. See STIGLITZ, supra note 78, at 462–63. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Agnar Sandmo, Asymmetric Information and Public Economics:  The Mirrlees-
Vickrey obel Prize, 13 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 165, 166–70 (1999). 
 96. Id. 
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for example, are two non-lump-sum tax schemes that typically serve as 
potential candidates for a second-best optimal tax measure.  The second-
best optimal tax generates a substitution effect that is minimized for a given 
distributional (or other) objective.97  All else equal, the excess burden under 
a first-best optimal tax scheme is smaller than under a second-best optimal 
tax scheme, which in turn is smaller than under any other tax option. 
The straightforward conclusion from this review of taxation and 
efficiency is that, holding all else equal (for example, distributional 
concerns), we are better off with taxes that minimize the excess burden 
(that is, minimize inefficiency).  For example, if the public requires 
additional resources of 100, we are better off designing a tax measure that 
minimizes its effect on individual behavior.  A head tax of 100 is probably 
the best choice in these terms.  If a lump-sum tax is unavailable, a second-
best tax measure that minimizes the excess burden of collecting 100 is 
preferable.  The welfare difference between a lump-sum tax and any other 
kind of tax—both generating 100 in revenue—is the excess burden 
generated by taxes other than lump-sum tax.  While both kinds of taxes 
generate an identical income effect—i.e., they both equally reduce taxpayer 
wealth—only the latter also changes relative market prices and hence 
generates a welfare-reducing substitution effect. 
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR PRICE INDICATION REGULATION 
As reviewed in Section I, price indication regulations adopted by 
consumer protection laws of European (and other) countries impose an 
obligation to include all consumption taxes in the sale price.98  The 
underlying presumption for the regulation of tax-inclusive prices is 
consumer ignorance, confusion, or misdirection by tax-exclusive prices.  In 
particular, consumers may be induced to consume more—that is, as if no 
(or lower) taxes are imposed on consumption—as they ignore non-included 
taxes. 
Accordingly, assume, for simplicity, that consumers completely 
ignore non-included taxes in their consumption choices.  Individuals then 
act as if their consumption is untaxed, although ultimately (i.e., at the 
cashier) they pay taxes.  Since individuals ultimately pay consumption 
taxes, their wealth diminishes, but they perceive no change in (relative) 
market prices due to consumption taxes; they ignore the effect of such taxes 
on prices.  If consumers perceive no change in relative market prices due to 
 
 97. Id. 
 98. Supra Section I.A. 
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consumption taxes, they act as if no such taxes were imposed.  Thus, 
individual ignorance or confusion eliminates the substitution effect.  If 
individuals overlook the effect of consumption taxes on relative market 
prices, no excess burden is generated. 
The conclusion, then, is that absolute individual confusion or 
ignorance of commodity taxes’ effect on market prices transforms 
distortive, imperfectly efficient consumption taxes into perfectly efficient, 
lump-sum-like taxes.  Perceiving no change in relative market prices 
prevents substituting among different individual behaviors and hence 
eliminates excess burden.  In this respect, individuals are better off.99  
Complete individual confusion or misdirection due to tax-exclusive prices 
improves well-being and thus, social welfare.  Consumption taxation with 
no perceived effect on relative market prices is similar to a perfectly 
efficient tax measure; it is similar to a lump-sum tax (of equal revenue).100 
This conclusion may seem counter-intuitive.  To further investigate 
the underlying intuition, this Article proffers the following stylized 
example:  Assume (i) a representative individual-taxpayer, (ii) only two 
commodities in society—C and L, and (iii) commodity L cannot be taxed 
(for example, leisure).  Assume that the government wishes to collect $100 
from each (representative) individual, and in order to achieve this fiscal 
need, the government imposes (or increases) tax on the consumption of 
commodity C.101  If the individual ignores the effect of the tax on the price 
of C—for instance, because she is confused by tax-exclusive price 
representation—then her consumption choices, given her lower wealth, 
would not change.  Her consumption would only change due to the fact she 
is $100 poorer.  Although relative market prices of consumption (or work) 
and leisure have changed, a confused taxpayer behaves as if no such change 
has occurred.  That is, the effect of such an increase in consumption taxes in 
this situation is equivalent to a $100 lump-sum tax. 
On the other hand, if the individual notices the change in relative 
prices due to a consumption tax, then not only would she change her 
behavior due the income effect (i.e., being $100 worse off), but she also 
changes her behavior due to the substitution effect.  She will further 
substitute the untaxed commodity (L) for the taxed commodity (C).  
Ignoring tax liability, substituting the consumption of L for C reduces the 
 
 99. See also Chetty et al., supra note 36, at 1166–76 (making a similar argument based 
on formal modeling of social welfare). 
 100. But see infra notes 104, 105 and accompanying text. 
 101. If more than two commodities are available for consumption, the analysis is similar 
as long as at least one commodity (such as leisure) is untaxable.  The government then 
typically chooses a certain uniform increase in commodity taxes (across all goods and 
services). 
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taxpayer’s well-being.  The reason is that before taxes, individuals optimize 
their consumption, which implies that the marginal utility (per $1) of 
consuming C equals the marginal utility (per $1) of consuming L.  
Accordingly, given decreasing marginal utility of consumption, the 
additional utility from the further consumption of L is lower than the lost 
utility of diminished consumption of C.  So why does the taxpayer choose 
to substitute L for C?  The reason is that the tax savings from such 
substitution is larger than the loss of utility.  Paying a higher tax-inclusive 
price for C is not worth as much as the non-lost utility of keeping the same 
consumption choice.  Because relative prices have changed while relative 
utilities of consumption remain the same, the taxpayer is better off 
substituting between C and L. 
This is correct to the extent that the tax rate is constant; however, 
the tax rate actually is not constant.  If the government sets the commodity 
tax on C to yield $100 revenue, and the taxpayer, at least partially, 
substitutes C with L, revenue will be lower than $100.  The taxpayer 
actually avoids paying the full $100 by substituting.  So, the government 
will increase the tax burden on C in order to collect the entire $100 that is 
required.  Assuming, realistically, that the government sets a budgetary 
goal—denoted in economic parlance as “revenue neutral” analysis102—the 
taxpayer will eventually pay $100 in taxes.  The more the taxpayer 
substitutes away from the taxed commodity, the higher the imposed 
consumption tax will be.  At the end of the day, the taxpayer pays $100 in 
taxes and partially substitutes away from the taxed commodity (C).  The 
taxpayer’s utility is thus lower due to a non-optimal consumption mix, and 
she still carries a $100 tax burden.  The taxpayer would have been better off 
had she not substituted away from the taxed commodity.  Then her wealth 
would have decreased by $100, but her utility from consumption (given her 
wealth) would not have changed; her consumption utility would have been 
maximized.  Put differently, whereas the income effect of $100 is 
supposedly unavoidable, the reduction in individual utility due to the 
substitution effect is avoidable if individuals refrain from substituting taxed 
and non-taxed commodities (or activities/behaviors). 
The conclusion thus far, then, is that taxpayers are better off being 
confused and misled regarding the effect of commodity taxes on 
consumption prices—for example, by tax-exclusive pricing.  Informed 
individuals react to adjustments in relative market prices due to taxes, 
which in turn diminish their utility.  Put more bluntly, if an individual had 
the choice ex ante, she would opt for the confusing/misleading tax-
 
 102. Louis Kaplow, Taxation and Redistribution: Some Clarifications, 60 TAX. L. REV. 
57, 74–75 (2007). 
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exclusive pricing system; she would elect to be “tricked.”  This may sound 
annoying to individuals, as “tricking” them apparently denies them of their 
freedom of choice to a certain degree; to this extent, it is indeed correct.  
The freedom, or ability to choose one’s own optimal behavior intelligibly 
allows her to pay less (or avoid paying) taxes.  But once individuals 
understand that at the end of the day they cannot pay less taxes, since the 
government (that is, society) requires certain revenue, the only outcome of 
their freedom of choice is an adverse change in behavior (to avoid paying 
taxes) with no reduction in tax burden.  Hence, individuals are better off 
being “tricked” or being denied such freedom to choose.  By extrapolation, 
society at large—or the aggregate utility of individuals—is better off by 
being completely misled by tax-exclusive prices.103  Accordingly, if 
consumer confusion or misleading is the underlying justification for price 
indication regulation, the policy prescription—that is, design of 
regulation—may better be the opposite.  If consumers are indeed misled by 
tax-exclusive prices and form choices as if there is no tax—and hence no 
adjustment to relative prices—then not only should retailers not be forced 
to indicate tax-inclusive prices, but society may actually be better off by 
making retailers state prices exclusive of taxes.  This can be a social 
welfare-increasing strategy. 
Yet, two important caveats are in order:  one concerns differential 
biases, and the other, the income effect.  The analysis so far assumed that 
individuals uniformly misperceive non-included taxes.  But it is arguable 
that consumer misperception varies across consumption items and that 
consumers may be differentially aware to taxes on different goods, under a 
tax-exclusive price system (for example, being fully aware of excluded 
taxes on one good while being unaware of excluded taxes on another).  In 
particular, consumers may be better aware, or invest further effort in 
becoming aware of non-included taxes on expensive goods.104  Consumers 
may tend to take the extra effort required to overcome their bias (for 
example, by using specialized assistance) and find out the relevant taxes 
when they buy a house or a car.  If consumers are aware of non-indicated 
 
 103. There might be political, and hence social, ramifications to such a misleading 
policy.  These types of potential adverse political outcomes should be generally accounted 
for, and may reverse the policy recommendation, though not the analysis and its conclusion.  
Yet, if such “consumers misleading” policy is clearly designed for the benefit of consumers, 
as explained in this section, no such adverse political outcomes should be expected.  See also 
a related discussion of the fiscal illusion hypothesis in Section VI, infra. 
 104. This may also be the case for recurring consumption goods; multiple identical 
transactions may induce consumers to acquire tax information.  In this case, since typically 
recurring transactions are inversely correlated with transaction prices (i.e., low-price 
transactions are much more common then high-price transactions), the conclusion might be 
that misperception of taxes does not vary systematically across consumption items. 
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taxes to varying degrees across consumption items, their choices will be 
distorted.  That is, perceived relative prices are different than the relative 
market prices in a no-tax world.  This means that while tax-exclusive prices 
allow avoiding (or reducing) one kind of distortion between work and 
leisure, another kind of distortion is generated—a distortion between the 
consumption of various goods.  Misperceiving non-included taxes avoids 
(or diminishes) the former kind of distortion but may also cause the latter.  
Avoiding the distortion across consumption goods by tax-inclusion pricing 
would restore the work-leisure distortion.  It is unclear a priori which of the 
two choices is welfare maximizing. 
A second caveat relates to the income effect.  The welfare 
implications of changes in behavior due the income and substitution effects 
are different.  As explained above, revised choices due the substitution 
effect, given revenue-neutrality, are welfare reducing since individuals will 
be better off not changing their behavior while paying the same amount of 
tax.  The implications of the income effect on individual welfare are 
different.  Individuals are better off changing their behavior due to the 
income effect—i.e., due to a decrease in wealth.  Whether an individual 
wealth decreases due to consumption taxes, theft, donation, or any other 
reason, she will be better off adjusting (that is, optimizing) her behavior 
accordingly.  Unlike the change in behavior due to adjusted relative market 
prices (i.e., the substitution effect) that offers a representative individual no 
utility under a revenue-neutral system, changing her behavior due the fact 
she is poorer is beneficial. 
Indeed, as explained above, the income effect is unavoidable as 
taxpayers pay the tax and in fact become poorer.  But what if individuals 
are unaware of their decrease in wealth?  If confused individuals are 
unaware of non-indicated consumption taxes, they may also be unaware 
that their real wealth (or purchasing power) has decreased due to such 
taxes, although they actually pay taxes.  Given individual (nominal) 
income, lower market prices increase her real income; she can consume 
more with the same amount of resources.  Hence, individual 
underestimation of market prices due to ignorance of sales taxes is 
equivalent to individual overestimation of real income.  In simple words, if 
individuals believe market prices are lower than actual, they feel richer; 
they feel they can purchase and consume more than they can actually do 
using their income.105  This implies that the income effect may not come 
 
 105. For example, assume an individual's nominal income is 1,000 with which she can 
purchase baskets of goods and services that are subject to a uniform commodity tax.  
Assume the after tax price of such a basket is 500, while the pre-tax price is 400.  The 
individual can actually purchase two baskets of goods and services; that is, her real income 
can be measured by two baskets.  But if the individual ignores the effect of commodity taxes 
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fully into effect:  individuals may make their consumption (and work) 
choices ignoring the fact that their real wealth is lower due to consumption 
taxes.  Misperceiving individual budget constraint impairs one’s ability to 
optimize her (consumption and work) choices.  The implication is not over-
consumption, as individuals cannot consume more than their resources 
allow them to, but distorted consumption.  Misperceiving real income may 
cause non-optimized consumption.  For example, it may be conjectured that 
inter-temporal consumption choices will be distorted as confused 
individuals over-consume initially (e.g., during working years) only to find 
out later (e.g., retirement) they were left with resources that cannot fulfill 
their consumption plans. 
Thus, ignoring the income effect can hurt individual utility.  If 
individuals ignore the reduction in real wealth due to non-indicated 
consumption taxes, then tax-exclusive prices do not necessarily raise social 
welfare.  Although consumer confusion may generate a counter-effect to 
the substitution effect, it may also prevent them from adjusting their 
consumption to a lower wealth level.  These two opposing effects on social 
welfare should be traded off, and hence no conclusion on price indication 
can be a priori correct. 
To sum up, misperception of non-included commodity taxes offers 
a social benefit in the form of avoided (or reduced) substitution between 
work and leisure.  But underestimation of market prices may also generate 
social costs either due to differentiated misperception of prices or due to 
non-optimized consumption choices where real income is overestimated.  
Overall, it is unclear a priori if consumers are better off by tax-inclusion.  
In particular, confusing consumers by tax-exclusive pricing may actually 
improve their well-being and hence social welfare. 
IV. JUSTIFYING TAX-INCLUSIVE PRICE SYSTEMS 
Concluding that potential under-estimation of prices due to non-
indicated taxes cannot necessarily justify price indication regulation, the 
question is whether a different rationale for tax-inclusive pricing can be 
suggested.  This section presents four potential justifications, all which are 
based on the informational premise of consumer under-estimation bias:  
encouraging competition, wealth distribution, information costs, and 
regulatory taxation.  This section generally concludes that only tax-based 
regulatory goals can support inclusion of taxes in prices, which implies a 
much narrower basis for tax-inclusive price regulation. 
                                                                                                                 
on prices, she will believe she is able to purchase and consume 2.5 baskets. 
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A. Facilitating Market Competition 
Full information about prices is obviously important for market 
competition.106  The E.U. directive on price indication explains that 
“transparent operation of the market and correct information is of benefit to 
consumer protection.”107  Where prices are stated clearly, consumers are 
better able to compare prices among producers of goods and providers of 
services, hence fostering competition among producers/providers, which is, 
in turn, to the benefit of consumers.108  Price indication rules, therefore, can 
be justified as a regulatory tool that fosters market competition. 
The competition rationale properly supports, for example, unit 
pricing, which is an important component of price indication regulation.  
Providing consumers with processed information that can be easily 
compared across similar products—such as price per unit of weight or 
volume—quite reasonably advances competition for the benefit of 
consumers.  But, the competition rationale is irrelevant to the tax inclusion 
issue.  Whether all prices include or exclude taxes does not affect 
competition.  Relative prices rather than absolute prices are important for 
competitive forces, and relative prices are the same regardless of whether 
the tax is included in the price or not. 
The competition rationale is consequential only to the extent that 
products or services are subject to different tax burdens.  There are two 
general instances of differentiated tax burdens schemes:  various services 
and products may carry different tax burden (or rate), or similar goods may 
be subject to different tax burden across different countries.  The first 
scenario is discussed later.109  In the second case, differentiated cross-border 
tax burdens cause relative prices under tax-inclusive and tax-exclusive price 
systems to diverge.  If, for example, a certain good is traded in two 
countries and is subject to a different VAT rate—say 10% in one 
jurisdiction and 20% in the other.  If the before-tax price of the good is 100 
in both countries (relative prices are 1-to-1), the tax-inclusive prices of the 
good may be 110 and 120 (relative prices are 11-to-12).  But notice that 
tax-exclusive prices in this scenario create no efficiency costs since 
 
 106. George Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POLIT. ECON. 213, 213–220 
(1961) (showing the effect of price information on market price dispersion). 
 107. Directive 98/6, supra note 9; see also Organisation for Economic Co-Operation 
and Development (OECD), Price Transparency 2001, DAFFE/CLP (2001) 22, available at 
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/52/63/2535975.pdf (last visited May 14, 2010). 
 108. See Robert Pitofsky, Beyond ader:  Consumer Protection and Regulation of 
Advertising, 90 HARV. L. REV. 661, 670–71 (1977) (discussing the beneficial effect of 
truthful advertising on competition). 
 109. See infra Part IV.D. 
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consumers are not induced to change their consumption (or work) behavior.  
Confused consumers may be induced to spend more on a product in the 
higher-VAT country.  This is a problem of transfer between countries, 
rather than an inefficiency or excess burden problem.110  That is, the social 
welfare of these two countries, taken together, is not affected by tax-
exclusive pricing systems.111 
B. Psychological Heterogeneity and Redistribution 
Thus far only a representative consumer was examined; that is, the 
implicit assumption was that all consumers are identical in their under-
estimation of tax-exclusive prices.  But, consumers’ biased estimation may 
be heterogeneous.  Certain consumers may not be misled by tax-exclusive 
pricing or can de-bias themselves; other consumers may under-estimate 
prices more excessively.  Heterogeneous effects of tax-exclusive prices on 
consumer price valuation can generate distributive outcomes, which might 
be socially important enough to allow for regulation of tax-inclusive 
prices.112 
The distributive outcome is caused by different reactions—that is, 
changes in behavior—of various individuals.  Assume that there are only 
two types of individuals—B, who is fully biased by tax-exclusive prices, 
and U, who is completely unbiased.  B is blind to any change in relative 
market prices due to consumption taxes, while U is fully aware of such 
changes and adjusts her behavior accordingly.  Following our analysis 
above, assume that the government imposes commodity taxes in order to 
collect a certain required amount of revenue.  If no individual changes her 
behavior due to the substitution effect (i.e., changes in relative market 
prices), the government would collect the required revenue.  But if one of 
the individuals (U) further changes her behavior—that is, substituting 
newly taxed commodities with others—she will reduce her tax liability.  
 
 110. See infra note 112 and accompanying text. 
 111. Indeed, underestimation of non-included taxes may weaken tax competition among 
jurisdictions.  See generally John Wilson, Theories of Tax Competition, 52 NAT’L TAX J. 269 
(1999). 
 112. Another argument is based on the assumption that consumer protection laws should 
redistribute among consumers and producers or retailers. If consumers are ignorant of 
commodity taxes, they react inelastically to taxes, which, in turn, implies that they will carry 
the entire incidence of taxes.  Then, informing consumers of taxes by explicit indication in 
prices causes changes in the tax incidence, relieving consumers of a portion of the tax 
burden and passing it on to producers/retailers.  Hence, tax-inclusion regulation may 
redistribute from producers to consumers. Yet the redistributive rationale of consumer 
protection laws is fairly doubtful.  Compared with the tax and transfer systems, consumer 
protection regulation is an extremely inferior mechanism of wealth redistribution. 
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The government then must increase the imposed commodity tax burden in 
order to collect the required revenue.  At the end of the process, the 
government will collect the intended total amount of taxes, but the burden 
will be divided differently between the two types of individuals.  Individual 
B will incur a larger burden of the commodity tax then he would have had 
if individual U were similarly confused by the tax-exclusive price; 
individual U will correspondingly bear a smaller portion of the tax burden.  
U’s ability to change her behavior due to the change in relative market 
prices makes her better off so long as the “avoided” taxes are paid also by 
others—that is, by type B individuals.  Type B individuals face higher 
market prices due to the consumption choices of Type U individuals.  Thus, 
in effect, under tax-exclusive pricing, individual heterogeneity (in 
confusion or bias) distributes resources from the more biased toward the 
less biased. 
The important questions, then, are whether such a distributional 
outcome is socially disturbing and whether it requires regulatory control.  
Numerous cross-subsidies among individuals exist in the market, and most 
are not necessarily considered socially undesirable to an extent that requires 
regulatory intervention.  For example, accident insurance contracts create 
cross-subsidization between clumsy and skilled individuals113 and short 
distance commuters cross-subsidize long distance commuters through equal 
payments for (non-toll) roads; and astute investors or businessmen are more 
successful, in particular, at the expense of poorly performing investors or 
businessmen.  These cross-subsidies among individuals do not require a 
regulatory fix.  It is far from being obvious that redistribution is required 
also along individuals with different psychological biases.  Not every kind 
of human non-uniformity requires regulatory intervention.  Individuals are 
different in many dimensions; some are considered more attractive or dress 
better, while others require extra hours of sleep at night.114  Society does not 
consider every kind of inequality to be worthy of redistribution.  Typically, 
redistribution is considered socially desirable along few individual features, 
such as income (or wealth or consumption), health, and family size.115 
 
 113. Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance 
Markets:  An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information, 90 Q. J. OF ECON. 629, 630–
37 (1976). 
 114. Cf. Lee Anne Fennell, Willpower and Legal Policy, 5 ANNUAL REV. OF L. AND 
SOCIAL SCI. 91, 102 (2009) (suggesting that problems of willpower or self-control might 
raise redistributive concerns since they affect individual well-being). 
 115. These individual characteristics are considered proxies of individual ability, which 
is unobservable directly.  It is unclear that biased perception of tax-exclusive prices is any 
proxy of lower ability.  See also Shaviro, supra note 31, at 758 (arguing, in passing, that 
“ability” for tax (or social welfare) purposes may include individual ability to derive utility 
from consumption).  Furthermore, even if one adopts an ability-to-pay criterion, it is unclear 
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Therefore, considering potential correlations between psychological 
biases and any of the mentioned individual features is interesting.  
Psychological biases might be negatively correlated with education level or 
intelligence quotient (IQ), which could be considered as partial proxies for 
income.  But on the other hand, the opportunity costs of self-debiasing 
resources (such as time and effort) are positively correlated with income as 
the time value of high-income earners is higher.  Thus, theoretical 
prediction is unattainable.116  Empirical evidence on these potential 
correlations is scarce.  The limited existing evidence indicates that low-
income or low-educated individuals acquire less information and make 
more mistakes,117 but they are not necessarily more vulnerable to 
psychological biases.118  Furthermore, it makes little sense to redistribute 
along a non-perfect proxy of income, while redistribution along income can 
be accomplished directly through an income tax system.119  The conclusion, 
then, is that only to the extent that it is socially desirable to redistribute 
across psychological biases—regardless of income or wealth—can tax-
inclusive price regulation be justified.120  However, note that this would not 
                                                                                                                 
how confusion about market prices or tax burdens affects a taxpayer’s ability to pay.  For 
example, would an ability-to-pay advocate support equal tax liability for a high-income 
biased consumer and low-income rational consumer? 
 116. Galle, supra note 49, at 49–54, claims that the distributive effects of cognitive 
biases and rational inattention are presumably different, with the tendency of cognitive 
biases to generate a regressive outcome, while the rational inattention induces a more 
progressive outcome.  I fail to see why the two opposing effects described in the text would 
not be equally at work under both rational and non-rational descriptions of behavior.  See 
also supra note 43. 
 117. See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PENN. L. 
REV. 101, 164–65 (2008) (pointing out that survey studies in the mortgage industry that 
show that lower-income and less-educated consumers are more likely to make mistakes). 
 118. See, e.g., Marianne Bertrand et al., What’s Psychology Worth? A Field Experiment 
in the Consumer Credit Market (2005) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author); 
Marianne Bertrand et al., Behavioral Economics and Marketing in Aid of Decision Making 
Among the Poor, 25 AM. MARKETING ASSOC. 8, 8–9 (2006) (arguing that although poor and 
rich individuals may exhibit the same behaviors, the effect on the poor may prove more 
crucial since the poor face tighter constraints.  This observation implies that the value of de-
biasing to the poor is higher); see also Chetty et al., supra note 36, at 35. 
 119. See MITCHELL A. POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 117–27 
(Aspen Publishers 1989) (explaining that non-tax redistribution is haphazard and can be 
contracted around); Richard Craswell, Passing on the Costs of Legal Rules:  Efficiency and 
Distribution in Buyer-Seller Relationships, 43 STAN. L. REV. 361, 368–85 (1991) (analyzing 
distributional outcomes of legal rules in consensual relationships); Jacob Nussim, 
Redistribution Mechanisms, 3 REV. OF L. AND ECON. 323, 333–35 (2007) (emphasizing the 
institutional component of redistribution); see also generally Louis Kaplow & Steven 
Shavell, Why the Legal System is Less Efficient than the Income Tax in Redistributing 
Income, 23 J. OF L. STUD. 667 (1994) (arguing that non-tax redistribution of wealth generates 
double distortion). 
 120. Additionally, protecting biased consumers through regulation may crowd out 
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be a consumer protection concern but an issue of redistribution.  Consumers 
are not necessarily protected by such regulation; non-biased consumers are 
actually hurt. 
C. Complexity Costs 
Tax-exclusive prices impose complexity costs on rational 
consumers since consumers are required to gather and process information 
in order to make rational consumption decisions.  The applicable tax rates 
must be revealed and the tax-inclusive prices computed.  These activities 
are complicated—that is, costly.  Reallocating the informational burden 
from consumers to retailers would most likely reduce complexity costs.  
Retailers are the cheapest information producers.  By indicating tax-
inclusive prices, retailers act as a joint representative of consumers, and 
relieve them of information costs.  Rather than having each and every 
consumer bear the informational burden in each and every transaction, 
retailers can undertake the informational responsibility by adopting a tax-
inclusive price system. 
But if consumers are indeed rational and would hence carry the 
informational burden under a tax-exclusive price system,121 no consumer 
protection regulation is required.  Market forces would most likely induce 
retailers to present tax-inclusive prices.  Competing retailers can gain 
competitive advantage by providing consumers with costly information.  If 
it is indeed cheaper for retailers to provide information by adopting tax-
inclusive prices, they maintain a profit-maximizing incentive to do so.  No 
protective regulation is required. 
On the other hand, if consumers are completely confused by tax-
exclusive prices, and completely ignore non-indicated taxes, then no 
complexity costs are induced.  No information is gathered or processed by 
consumers, and the lack of such information is ignored.  Thus, tax-inclusive 
price regulation saves no complexity costs.  On the contrary, it raises social 
complexity since it requires retailers to produce information which is not 
demanded by consumers, and thus saves no costs for consumers.  In the 
                                                                                                                 
personal incentive to educate and debias oneself.  See Jonathan Click & Gregory Mitchell, 
Government Regulation of Irrationality:  Moral and Cognitive Hazards, 90 MINN. L. REV. 
1620, 1627–41 (2006). 
 121. Rational consumers do not necessarily invest in the gathering and processing of 
information.  If information costs are higher than their expected benefit, it is rational to 
refrain from such tasks.  But it does not imply that consumers avoid these (complexity) 
costs. Rather, they minimize these costs.  Instead of bearing the actual information costs, 
consumers would bear the reduction in utility due to the absence of information (e.g., 
mistakes, uncertainty).  See also supra note 43. 
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absence of regulation, retailers would choose not to indicate taxes since 
biased consumers would not be willing to pay for such information 
(through higher market prices).  This market solution is socially superior. 
The more interesting case is of heterogeneous consumers (as was 
presented in the preceding section).  Consumers’ cognitive abilities may 
vary:  some consumers are fully rational, some are less rational, and some 
are completely fooled by tax-exclusive prices.  In this case, society will 
likely be better off if retailers undertake the informational burden as long as 
the set of non-biased consumers is sufficiently large.  Only if sufficiently 
enough (non-biased) consumers incur complexity costs, it is socially 
beneficial to have retailers produce information by including taxes in 
prices.  The question is if regulating tax-inclusive prices gets us closer to 
the socially preferable outcome than allowing for undisturbed market 
forces.  No absolute a priori theoretical answer can be provided to this 
question.  But it does seem in general that the market solution is more likely 
to minimize informational costs (that is, complexity) and hence is a superior 
solution socially. 
Stiglitz and Salop investigated a general case of consumer 
information costs—in their model, positive search costs.  If consumers have 
to invest resources in search for products, producers gain certain 
monopolistic power and can utilize it for their advantage at the expense of 
consumers.  For example, if it is costly to compare prices of all producers, 
then in reality fewer producers compete on relevant segments of the market, 
and hence competition is impaired, which in turn leads to higher market 
prices.  Stiglitz and Salop showed that where price information is costly for 
some consumers—that is, positive search costs—a competitive market 
reaches competitive price equilibrium if there are enough fully (costlessly) 
informed consumers.122  The fully informed consumers drive down market 
prices by inducing suppliers to reduce their prices in order to gain their 
market share—i.e., the market share of fully informed consumers.123  That 
is, if the market share of informed consumers is not too small, producers 
will compete on their share and accordingly reduce market prices to the 
benefit of all consumers.  Put differently, competitive market prices do not 
necessitate full information by all market participants, but by a sufficiently 
large subset of them. 
The same analysis can be applied to the tax-inclusion issue.  Non-
 
 122. See Steven Salop & Joseph Stiglitz, Bargains and Ripoffs:  A Model of 
Monopolistically Competitive Price Dispersion, 44 REV. OF ECON. STUDIES 493, 499–502 
(1977); see also Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of 
Imperfect Information:  A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630, 640–51 
(1979). 
 123. Salop & Stiglitz, supra note 122, at 499–502. 
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biased consumers are fully aware of non-included taxes and therefore gain 
from simplified tax-inclusive prices.  It saves them complexity costs.  A 
sufficiently large share of non-biased consumers would hence induce 
retailers to post prices inclusive of tax.  Retailers are better off stating tax-
inclusive prices since they try to gain, and hence compete over, the share of 
non-biased consumers.  Yet, if the share of non-biased consumers in the 
market is excessively small, retailers would choose to ignore non-biased 
consumers, present tax-exclusive prices, and make an extra profit thanks to 
biased consumers.  This result is, in general, socially desirable.  As 
described above, producing information through tax-inclusion is socially 
beneficial only for non-biased consumers.  It saves them personal 
information costs, but only to them.  Accordingly, a smaller share of non-
biased consumers in the economy makes tax-inclusive prices socially 
undesirable, since unneeded information is produced and complexity is 
actually increased.  Only to the extent there are enough non-biased 
consumers, information production by retailers via tax-inclusive prices is 
socially beneficial.  Indeed, it seems that market forces are generally in 
accord with the social goal:  a larger share of rational consumers requires 
tax-inclusive pricing, and indeed market forces would drive retailers to 
include taxes in prices, whereas a smaller share of non-biased consumer 
requires no superfluous information costs, and, as Stiglitz and Salop 
explain, market forces probably would not induce retailers to include taxes 
in stated prices.  Tax-inclusive regulation, then, cannot be easily justified on 
the basis of information costs. 
D. Regulatory Taxation 
A small, designated subset of commodity taxes retains a regulatory 
function:  control of behavior.124  In particular, negative externalities—such 
as pollution—can be constrained by taxes.125  These taxes are also denoted 
as Pigouvian taxes or corrective taxes, the purpose of which is to change or 
restrain certain socially undesirable behavior.126  Examples include taxes on 
carbon emissions, fuel, congestion, tobacco, and alcohol.127  Effective 
Pigouvian taxes must be fully considered by taxpayers to change individual 
behavior in a socially desirable manner.  Thus, under-valuation of 
Pigouvian taxes dilutes their regulatory effectiveness.  In contrast to 
revenue-producing taxes, with behavior-control taxes, the substitution 
 
 124. See generally Lawrence H. Summers, The Case for Corrective Taxation, 44 NAT’L 
TAX J. 289, 289–92 (Sept. 1991). 
 125. Id. at 290. 
 126. Id. at 289–90. 
 127. See, e.g., State Sales, supra note 29. 
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effect is most desirable. 
In this context, price indication regulation is required only for 
corrective taxes which apply to a very limited set of commodities (for 
example, carbon emissions, alcohol).  This analysis of price indication 
regulation partially conforms to the U.S. practice.  While state sales taxes 
are not included in commodity prices, excise taxes are included in, for 
instance, alcohol prices.128 
However, the use of regulatory taxation might be somewhat wider 
and is related to differential tax rate systems.  VAT systems in European 
countries and sales tax systems in U.S. states tend to evolve into a non-
uniform tax rate system.129  Although policy-makers usually prefer a 
uniform consumption tax rate,130 in practice, several subsets of consumption 
goods and services—such as newspapers, medical care and products, and 
food—might be completely exempted from commodity taxes or sustain a 
lower tax rate.131  Generally, there are three reasons to adopt a differentiated 
rate scheme:  regulation of behavior, redistribution, and complexity.132 
 
 128. See, e.g., Chetty et al., supra note 36, at 1158 (discussing the effects of excise and 
sales taxes on alcohol sales). 
 129. See COPENHAGEN ECONOMICS, STUDY ON REDUCED VAT APPLIED TO GOODS AND 
SERVICES OF THE MEMBER STATES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 39 (2007) [hereinafter 
COPENHAGEN ECONOMICS], available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/taxation/vat/how_vat_works/rates
/study_reduced_VAT.pdf (last visited May 14, 2010). 
 130. See, e.g., THE PRESIDENT’S ADVISORY PANEL ON FEDERAL TAX REFORM, SIMPLE, 
FAIR, AND PRO-GROWTH: PROPOSALS TO FIX AMERICA’S TAX SYSTEM 198 (2005), available 
at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/taxreformpanel (follow “Final Report Issued” hyperlink; 
then follow “Chapter Eight - Nine” hyperlink) (last visited May 14, 2010) [hereinafter 
PRESIDENT’S ADVISORY PANEL] (stating that the “VAT should be imposed at a single 
uniform rate”); DUE & MIKESELL, supra note 36, at 27; Council Directive 2006/112, supra 
note 28, arts. 96, 97 (requiring and establishing standard VAT rates); Henry J. Aaron, 
Introduction and Summary, in THE VALUE-ADDED TAX:  LESSONS FROM EUROPE 1, 8–9, 16 
(Henry J. Aaron ed., 1981). 
 131. See, e.g., DUE & MIKESELL, supra note 36, at 75–88; Mikesell, supra note 33, at 
154–55 (listing exemptions by category and state); LIAM P. EBRILL ET AL., THE MODERN 
VAT 68–100 (2001) (discussing complexity and administrability in Chapter 5, experience 
and recommendations in Chapter 6, and rate differentiation in Chapter 7); RONALD JOHN HY 
& WILLIAM L. WAUGH JR., STATE AND LOCAL TAX POLICIES:  A COMPARATIVE HANDBOOK 
31–32, 91–100 (1995) (giving examples of sales tax exemptions); Council Directive 
2006/112, supra note 28, art. 98, annex III (applying reduced rates from Article 98 to certain 
goods and services listed in Annex III); see also RICHARD M. BIRD & PIERRE-PASCAL 
GENDRON, THE VAT IN DEVELOPING AND TRANSITIONAL COUNTRIES 211 (2007) (discussing 
arguments for and against tax salience in the context of taxing a broad base of services). 
 132. See, e.g., JAMES M. BICKLEY, VALUE-ADDED TAX:  CONCEPTS, POLICY ISSUES, AND 
OECD EXPERIENCES 18–20 (Novinka Books 2003) (explaining that redistribution concerns 
trigger differentiated VAT rates); ALAN SCHENK & OLIVER OLDMAN, VALUE-ADDED TAX:  A 
COMPARATIVE APPROACH 54 (2007) (arguing that both redistribution and behavior regulation 
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(i) Regulating Behavior:  If the use of public transportation, or the 
use of energy saving appliances, or distribution of information by 
newspapers is considered valuable for society (for example, because it 
generates positive externalities), the government may attempt to encourage 
its consumption, or at least, not to excessively discourage it through 
consumption taxes.  A lower VAT rate on energy saving appliances or 
books is a kind of subsidy for socially beneficial behavior.133  Given a VAT 
system, lower rates act as Pigouvian subsidies; their function is to 
encourage particular individual behavior.  Similar to the Pigouvian taxes 
case, the reaction of individuals to the tax incentive—i.e., the substitution 
effect—is important.  To the extent that the purpose of differentiated VAT 
rates is to encourage behavior, society is better off when individuals are 
fully aware of the encouragement and fully react to it.134  Individuals should 
not be confused in this case, and thus, tax-inclusive prices are justified. 
In this case, not only should the prices of preferred goods be tax-
inclusive, but also prices of all other taxed goods and services.  In order for 
consumers to appreciate the lower tax burden on preferred goods, they must 
be aware of the relatively higher tax burden on non-preferred goods.  
Therefore, in the case of differentiated VAT rates based on the Pigouvian 
subsidy (or tax) rationale, a system-wide tax-inclusive pricing method is 
justified. 
The result of this analysis is that, given consumer confusion by tax-
exclusive prices, if a differentiated tax rate is desirable in order to regulate 
consumption behavior, then tax-inclusive prices offer social value.  
However, we should still be aware of the loss of social welfare due to non-
regulatory, undesirable substitution.  The social value of regulating 
behavior should be traded off against the social loss due to substitution by 
consumers who consume non-preferred goods.  It is not a priori clear that 
the first (regulatory) effect outweighs the second (distortive) effect.  
Furthermore, it is plausible that in certain cases society will be better off if 
                                                                                                                 
cause differentiated tax rates); Alan Tait, Value-Added Tax, ational, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF TAXATION AND TAX POLICY 422, 422–23 (Joseph J. Cordes et al. eds., 1999) (suggesting 
that complexity and redistribution drive European countries to adopt differentiated tax rates). 
 133. See COPENHAGEN ECONOMICS, supra note 129, at 5, 32–33. 
 134. The same rationale applies to other less-prevalent arguments based on efficiency 
and merit goods. A differentiated commodity tax rate may prove superior on efficiency 
grounds due to differentiated association with leisure.  See, e.g., W.J. Corlett & D.C. Hague, 
Complementarity and the Excess Burden of Taxation, 21 REV. OF ECON. STUDIES 21 (1953).  
It may also prove superior due to substitution with non-taxed homemade consumption.  See, 
e.g., COPENHAGEN ECONOMICS, supra note 129, at 20–21.  Additionally, to the extent that 
certain goods—such as books, music, cultural events—are considered “merit goods,” society 
may wish to encourage their consumption through lower tax burdens.  See id. at 32–33; 
TAIT, supra note 21, at 69 et seq.  In these cases, the rationale similarly applied—i.e., society 
is better off if individuals are fully aware of, and react to, the reduced tax. 
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encouragement (or discouragement) of behavior will be accomplished 
outside the VAT/RST (retail sales tax) system.  Given consumer confusion 
under a tax-exclusive commodity tax system, by using a separate tax (or 
subsidy) instrument,135 or a non-tax regulating instrument, society can enjoy 
both welfare-increasing effects—that is, lump-sum-like tax and regulation 
of individual behavior—rather than choose one or the other. 
(ii) Redistribution:  Equity preferences seem to be a principal 
reason for imposing lower consumption tax rates on certain subsets of 
consumption.136  Examples include food, housing, public transport, and 
utilities.137  Because poor taxpayers’ incomes are largely used for the 
purchase of basic consumption goods, imposing a lower tax on these goods 
generate a progressive effect.  For a similar reason, higher tax rates are 
sometimes levied on certain luxuries.138 
(iii) Complexity:  Adopting differentiated commodity tax rates can 
be socially advisable if it proves to be too complicated (i.e., costly) to tax 
every kind of good or service.  Certain goods or services may be difficult to 
tax, or taxes on these goods or services may be difficult to enforce (for 
example, due to monitoring or measurement difficulties).  For example, 
services and intangible property are typically not taxed under U.S. state 
sales tax for this reason;139 financial services are not always taxed under 
VAT systems for a similar reason.140 
It should be clear, following the analysis so far, that, to the extent 
that consumption tax rates are differentiated due to either redistribution or 
complexity issues, the tax-exclusive pricing option may actually be 
reinforced.  A differentiated consumption tax rate scheme creates 
additional, excessive substitution toward low-tax commodities.  Assuming 
that substitution is socially undesirable—because the reason for tax 
exemption is redistribution or complexity rather than directing behavior—
 
 135. Excise taxes (and subsidies) such as those mentioned above (e.g., taxes on alcohol, 
gas, and pollution) are designed as a separate consumption tax mechanism.  That is, it might 
be possible to have a uniform-rate consumption-tax system under which taxes are not 
included in prices, along with an additional system of specific excise taxes and subsidies that 
are included in prices. 
 136. See COPENHAGEN ECONOMICS, supra note 129, at 29–33. 
 137. Id.; TAIT, supra note 21, at 58–68. 
 138. Louis Kaplow, Income Taxation and Government Policy (Harvard Law School 
John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics and Business Discussion Paper Series No. 518, at 
4 2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=825568 (last 
visited May 14, 2010). 
 139. Mikesell, supra note 33, at 155–57; Kirk J. Stark, The Uneasy Case for Extending 
the Sales Tax to Services, 30 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 435, 451–58 (2003) (investigating the 
problems of broadening the sales tax to encompass services). 
 140. See, e.g., TAIT, supra note 21, at 92–99. 
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society might be better off with a “misleading” tax-exclusive price 
system.141  Under this system, certain commodities are not burdened by 
taxes, while taxes on the remainder of commodities are ignored due to 
confusion.  This results in no distortion due to redistribution or complexity; 
a differentiated tax rate can help the poor or relieve complexity, while 
inducing no substitution toward the non-taxed or lower-taxed 
commodities.142 
In sum, the principal theory supporting the notion of tax-inclusive 
pricing is most likely based on a specific goal of regulating behavior.  
Acknowledging this helps us draw two conclusions.  First, the scope of 
prescribing tax-inclusive pricing is more limited than what is envisioned 
under the “consumer confusion” hypothesis.  Consumption taxes are mostly 
designed with non-regulatory goals in mind.143  Second, price indication 
laws should not necessarily aim to prevent consumer confusion in general, 
but may rather attempt to reinforce the regulatory function of taxes.  A 
corollary of this conclusion is that the focal location of tax-inclusive 
regulation should be within tax law, rather than in consumer protection law. 
V. EXTENSIONS 
A. Income-based Taxes 
The price of effort—that is, work—is typically stated gross-of-tax 
and the tax burden on work effort is not separately stated.  Accordingly, a 
consistent approach to individual cognitive biases—which supports a 
“consumer confusion” hypothesis—would posit an analogous argument in 
the individual-worker case:  “worker confusion” or “worker over-valuation” 
hypothesis.  Suppliers of work may be confused or misled by gross-of-tax 
salaries that are offered in the market.  An individual who offers her human 
capital in the market may be misled to believe that the return is higher than 
it actually is net of wage taxes, and hence would choose to work (and invest 
 
 141. Although it is not a necessary result under the theory of second-best, there is no 
reason to believe, in this case, that the additional tax distortion (i.e., due to complexity or 
redistribution) may increase welfare. 
 142. Admittedly, the same caveats (see supra text accompanying notes 104, 105) 
similarly apply to this case. 
 143. The analysis focused only on public-interest-based reasons for designing a 
differentiated tax scheme—i.e., regulating behavior, redistribution, and complexity. Private-
interest reasons—e.g., assisting a particular industry—may be suggested as well.  To the 
extent that private interests influence the design of consumption taxes, the conclusion is 
similar: taxes should not be included in prices because the differentiated tax rate would 
cause an unwanted substitution effect. 
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in human capital) too much.  A “worker protection” measure can take the 
form of “salary indication” regulation that requires presentation of only net-
of-tax salaries.  Presumably, the reason that no “salary indication” 
regulation is advocated is its relative complexity.  Because income taxes are 
far from uniform across equal-income taxpayers, net-of-tax indications 
would require gathering and processing individual information (some which 
may be private) for every wage offer.144  
This Article offers an additional rationale for gross-of-tax wage 
presentation.  If workers are completely confused by gross-of-tax wages 
(and are being paid with sufficient frequency), they are better off.  Misled 
workers will supply effort (and invest in human capital) as if no income 
taxes are imposed; they will not substitute leisure for work.  Complete 
ignorance of wage taxes will transform a second-best optimal tax scheme 
into first-best optimal lump-sum taxes.  Like “tricking” consumers, 
“tricking” workers may improve social welfare. 
Furthermore, the potential drawbacks of misperceived commodity 
taxes are largely absent from a (generally equivalent145) wage tax.146  First, 
the effect of wage taxes is uniform across consumption items, and hence 
misperception of taxes cannot distort choice among consumption 
possibilities.  Second, the potential distortion to the income effect due to 
ignored taxes is most likely much smaller under a wage tax.  Wage taxes 
directly reduce taxpayers’ nominal income, and hence real income.  A 
taxpayer, who is completely ignorant of levied wage taxes, still has access 
to an independent source of budgetary information—for example, checking 
her wallet or bank account.  Whether or not a taxpayer is aware of the wage 
taxes she pays, she can be easily informed of her budget or net income.  
Individuals do not aggregate tax payments in order to calculate net 
available income.  In order to make correct (consumption and work) 
choices, individuals just check how much resources (for example, money) 
they own at each relevant point of time.  Even where individuals are not 
aware of levied taxes, they are still typically aware of the amount of money 
they possess.  As long as a taxpayer adjusts her behavior to her net income 
status, it does not matter if her income is lower due to taxes or any other 
reason, and being aware of tax payments is irrelevant.  That is, the income 
effect is most likely fully accounted for by a taxpayer who completely 
misperceives wage taxes. 
The only necessary constraint is that the taxpayer net income 
 
 144. Interestingly, in Italy, wages are commonly stated in net-of-tax terms. 
 145. See Louis Kaplow, Taxation and Risk Taking: A General Equilibrium Perspective, 
47 NAT’L TAX J. 789, 793–94 (1994) [hereinafter Kaplow, Risk Taking]. 
 146. See supra notes 104, 105 and accompanying text. 
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actually diminishes due to wage taxes; that is, it depends on the frequency 
of wage tax payments.  It makes some difference whether wages are being 
paid weekly, biweekly, monthly or yearly.  Assume, for example, that an 
employee is being paid a biweekly salary of, say $5,000 before income 
taxes, where a flat 30% wage (or income) tax applies.  At the beginning of a 
two weeks work, a confused employee may plan her consumption given an 
expected increase of $5,000 to her net income.  Once she gets her salary, 
her bank account shows an increase of $3,500 only (due to income taxes).  
Assuming individuals do not ignore net income information obtained from 
their bank account, her consumption choices can be distorted only to the 
extent of $1,500.  That is, she might make wrong consumption choices 
thinking (constantly) she is $1,500 richer.  Such distortion to the income 
effect is most likely negligible.  Indeed, had salaries been paid on a yearly 
basis, she may (constantly) overestimate her net income by $36,000 
(=$120,000 annual salary times 30% tax rate).147  Accordingly, frequent 
payments of wage taxes minimize the distortion in individual consumption 
choices due to the income effect. 
This analysis may be further expanded to other components of an 
income tax base.  For example, interest, dividend or rent income may also 
be presented net-of-tax.  Again, stating the return to capital investment or 
loans gross-of-tax may confuse taxpayers; they may believe the gain is 
higher than the actual net-of-tax return, and hence tend to excessively invest 
or provide credit.  Furthermore, unlike wage taxes, in various jurisdictions 
interest and dividend tax rates are flat rather than graduated, which make it 
quite simple to indicate returns net-of-tax.148  The repeated argument in this 
Article is that stating returns in gross-of-tax terms may thwart the 
substitution effect in these cases if taxpayers are confused, and hence may 
minimize the excess burden. 
B. Demand-Increasing Market Strategies 
The discussion and analysis in this Article may take us even further 
beyond the tax-exclusive/inclusive question.  For the purposes of this 
subsection, ignore the previous discussion of confusion and misperception 
of non-included taxes.  Specifically, assume that either an optimal and 
perfectly perceived consumption tax (like VAT or sales tax) or a wage tax 
 
 147. In reality, wages taxes are paid frequently (weekly, biweekly, or monthly) due to 
the withholding at source mechanism. 
 148. The situation grows further complicated upon the assumption that payers of income 
may also be confused and misperceive the deductions to which they are entitled (for 
payments of interest or salary). 
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exists, or both—that is, a second-best optimal tax system that (optimally) 
distorts behavior due to the substitution effect described above.  
Additionally, assume a uniform (rather than differentiated) consumption tax 
rate or a proportional wage tax rate, which are actually equivalent.149  
Accordingly, the tax induced distortion is of labor and leisure:  under either 
tax system, individuals similarly tend to work less (and consume less in the 
market) and alternatively consume more leisure. 
Now, focus on the uniform commodity tax scheme.  It is second-
best optimal due to the labor-leisure distortion, which is absent under a 
lump-sum tax.  Under a lump-sum tax, the demand for consumption (and 
correspondingly, supply of work) is higher since substitution effect is nil.150  
Therefore, exogenously increasing consumers’ demands, holding all else 
constant, counteracts the substitution effect and is thus a welfare-increasing 
strategy.  Indeed, as discussed above, confusing or deceiving consumers 
who consequently ignore the imposed tax can be considered as one such 
strategy.  Another strategy might be spontaneously offered by the market. 
Sellers of goods and services are involved, to a large extent, in 
increasing consumer demand for their products.  Marketing tactics, 
advertising, price presentation, etc. are all attempts by sellers to gain market 
share among a limited pool of consumers and to increase demand without 
reducing prices.  These demand-increasing strategies are based not just on 
revealing necessary information to the consumer, but also on consumer 
confusion or misperception.  Marketing methods are often developed to 
exploit the cognitive biases of consumers.  The marketing literature 
presents and examines a wide range of such marketing strategies that are 
employed in the market.  A few examples of price presentation strategies 
were presented in Section II.151  Numerous other examples are available in 
the marketing literature.152  For example, nine-ending prices prove to affect 
sales;153 different promotional forms influence demand differently;154 
 
 149. See, e.g., Kaplow, Risk Taking, supra note 145, at 791–94 (discussing the 
equivalence between a uniform commodity tax and a proportional wage tax). 
 150. See supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
 151. See supra notes 61–74 and accompanying text.  
 152. See generally THOMAS T. NAGLE & REED K. HOLDEN, THE STRATEGY AND TACTICS 
OF PRICING:  A GUIDE TO PROFITABLE DECISION MAKING 265 et seq. (4th ed. 2006).  
 153. See generally, e.g., Mark Stiving & Russell S. Winer, An Empirical Analysis of 
Price Endings with Scanner Data, 24 J. CONSUMER RES. 57 (1997) (showing experimentally 
the price underestimation effect of prices ending with the digit 9); Robert M. Schindler & 
Patrick N. Kirby, Patterns of Rightmost Digits Used in Advertised Prices:  Implications for 
ine-Ending Effects, 24 J. CONSUMER RES.192 (1997) (same); Manoj Thomas & Vicki 
Morwitz, Penny Wise and Pound Foolish:  The Left-Digit Effect in Price Cognition, 32 J. 
CONSUMER RES. 54 (2005) (same); Eric Anderson & Duncan Simester, Effects of $9 Price 
Endings on Retail Sales: Evidence from Field Experiments, 1 QUANTITATIVE MARKETING 
AND ECONOMICS 93 (2003) (suggesting, based on field experiments, that the effect of 9 
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temporal price framing may reduce the perceived cost of consumption;155 
comparative price advertising increase consumers’ demand by raising their 
perceived reference price.156 
Generally, marketing strategies that exploit consumer cognitive 
biases may be deplored as misleading and deceiving.  But, regulating such 
market behavior may not necessarily be socially wise given the existence of 
commodity (or wage) taxation.  These demand-increasing strategies offer a 
social value.  They offer potential offsets to the demand-reducing effect of 
second-best optimal taxes.  Misleading consumers in a manner that 
increases their demand for products is effectively no different than 
generating an under-estimation of commodity prices.  That is, in a no-tax 
world, such marketing strategies are welfare reducing as they induce 
excessive consumption (and work).  But if distortive consumption taxes are 
employed, the extra consumption (and work) induced by these marketing 
strategies becomes restorative rather than excessive. 
This Article does not necessarily advocate misleading consumers in 
order to increase their demand for consumption.  In particular, the 
difference between consumer under-estimation due to tax-exclusive prices 
and marketing strategies is that only under the former there may be a good 
reason to believe that consumers will be uniformly confused across all 
commodities.157  Marketing strategies, on the other hand, may differentially 
affect the consumption of different products.  Such a differentiated effect 
generates its own distortion—i.e., substitution across commodities.158 
The purpose of this discussion is to elucidate to consumer 
                                                                                                                 
endings is informational). 
 154. See, e.g., David M. Hardesty & William O. Bearden, Consumer Evaluations of 
Different Promotion Types and Price Presentations:  The Moderating Role of Promotional 
Benefit Level, 79 J. RETAILING 17, 18–22 (2003) (comparing the effects of price discounts 
and bonus packs); Chen et al., supra note 66, at 357–69 (comparing the effects of price 
discounts and coupons); see also generally Indrajit Sinha & Michael F. Smith, Consumers’ 
Perceptions of Promotional Framing of Price, 17 PSYCHOL. & MARKETING 257 (2000) 
(arguing that the framing of deals—i.e., price reduction versus volume promotion—affects 
perception). 
 155. See generally, e.g., John T. Gourville, Pennies-a-Day:  The Effect of Temporal 
Reframing on Transaction Evaluation, 24 J. CONSUMER RES. 395 (1998) (showing 
experimentally and theorizing the effect of temporal framing of pricing). 
 156. See generally, e.g., Dhruv Grewal et al., The Effects of Price-Comparison 
Advertising on Buyers’ Perceptions of Acquisition Value, Transaction Value, and Behavioral 
Intentions, 62 J. MARKETING 46 (1998); Larry D. Compeau & Dhruv Grewal, Comparative 
Price Advertising: An Integrative Review, 17 J. PUB. POLICY & MARKETING 257 (1998). 
 157. See supra notes 104, 145–46 and accompanying text. 
 158. Additionally, the extent to which marketing strategies mislead consumers and 
increase demand is also important.  Marketing strategies should not be allowed to have an 
excessive effect on demand (though intuitively it seems to be far from excessive given 
current tax rates in developed countries). 
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protection regulators the positive effect of market-based strategies based on 
consumer confusion, where consumption or wage taxes exist.  The demand-
increasing marketing strategies described above (and others) should not 
necessarily be on the front line of consumer protection regulation; they are 
not all bad. 
CONCLUSION 
Rather than restating the analysis and conclusions of this Article, 
this final section discusses a few closely related issues.  First, on the issue 
of methodological approaches, this Article adopts a welfarist method.  
Under a welfarist methodology, legal rules are evaluated according to their 
effect on social welfare, which is the aggregate of individual well-being.159 
Clearly, other methods of analysis are possible, such as “rights” or 
entitlement approaches that can be based on the Kantian idea of personal 
autonomy.  Consumers, under a “rights” approach, are entitled to certain 
regulatory protection regardless of any competing considerations—such as 
social welfare.160  Another potential approach is based on the concept of 
community/public values.  In this context, consumer protection regulation 
promotes values such as honesty and fairness, and contributes to the 
development of trust and confidence in society.161 One may alternatively 
adopt a theory of liberal values,162 promote collective desires and 
aspirations,163 attempt to redesign individual preferences,164 stress various 
public policy goals,165 etc.  Under any of the non-welfarist approaches, the 
analysis and conclusion may change.  The welfarist analysis in this paper 
can provide advocates of other approaches with a social welfare benchmark 
 
 159. See generally KAPLOW, THEORY OF TAXATION, supra note 1, at 348–58 (describing 
the welfarist methodology). 
 160. See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart & Cass R. Sunstein, Public Programs and Private 
Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1193, 1232–36, 1307–16 (1982) (discussing the concept of 
entitlement as affecting the relationship between private rights and public law); Richard B. 
Stewart, Regulation in a Liberal State:  The Role of on-Commodity Values, 92 YALE L. J. 
1537, 1556–59 (1983) (discussing the concept of entitlement as a basis for regulation). 
 161. See, e.g., Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 160, at 1238. 
 162. See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 160, at 1566–87 (presenting and applying a non-
commodity approach to regulation). 
 163. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION:  RECONCEIVING THE 
REGULATORY STATE 57–60 (1990). 
 164. See id. at 64–67. 
 165. See, e.g., Marshall S. Shapo, A Representational Theory of Consumer Protection:  
Doctrine, Function and Legal Liability for Product Disappointment, 60 VA. L. REV. 1109, 
1369–88 (1974) (using various public policy criteria to evaluate a suggested approach to 
consumer protection). 
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against which other non-welfarist considerations can be weighed. 
A closely related issue to this paper’s discussion is the fiscal 
illusion hypothesis, which maintains, inter alia, that taxpayers misperceive 
certain non-salient or hidden taxes.166  It is a political hypothesis, and its 
concern is the political outcome where voter-taxpayers under-value their 
tax burden.  For example, an excessively large government is expected 
under the fiscal illusion hypothesis.167  Even though the empirical validity 
of the hypothesis is questionable,168 it does seem to weigh on contemporary 
tax policy and design.169  For example, it is argued that tax-inclusive prices 
under a VAT system hide the commodity tax burden from taxpayers who 
observe only final prices, and hence may not be aware of included taxes.170 
Accordingly, the “consumer protection” and “fiscal illusion” 
hypotheses appear to contradict each other.  The “consumer protection” 
hypothesis assumes that consumers under-value the commodity tax burden 
under a tax-exclusive price system, while the “fiscal illusion” hypothesis 
argues that consumers under-value the tax burden under a tax-inclusive 
price system.  These contradicting hypotheses are not easily reconciled.  
This Article argues against the “consumer protection” hypothesis, and 
hence incidentally relieves this alleged tension. 
Finally, also related are issues of paternalism and de-biasing 
through law.  Paternalism has long been a source of regulation.171  The 
paternalistic justification for governmental intervention in the market has 
recently gained considerable force with the flood of studies examining 
cognitive errors and limitations.172  The understandable uneasiness with 
 
 166. See supra note 4.  Another related political conjecture is the tax aversion 
hypothesis, which asserts that people are averse to taxes and that hidden taxes circumvent 
such cognitive bias.  See, e.g., McCaffery, Cognitive Theory, supra note 49, at 1878 
(“[T]here may be a phenomenon of ‘tax aversion,’ akin to but distinct from loss aversion, 
whereby individuals attach disproportionate disutility to government extractions perceived 
or labeled as ‘taxes’”).  See also supra note 54 in its entirety.  
 167. BUCHANAN, supra note 4, at 126–143. 
 168. See supra note 27. 
 169. For example, the U.S. President’s Advisory Panel (2005) was reluctant to fully 
support a federal VAT system, inter alia, on the basis of fiscal illusion.  See PRESIDENT’S 
ADVISORY PANEL, supra note 130, at 204; see also BIRD & GENDRON, supra note 131, at 
210–12. 
 170. PRESIDENT’S ADVISORY PANEL, supra note 130, at 204; see also BIRD & GENDRON, 
supra note 131, at 210–12. 
 171. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 33–34 (1982) (indicating 
that paternalism may justify regulatory measures). 
 172. See, e.g., Rachlinski, supra note 3 (reviewing and critiquing studies that support 
paternalistic interventions on the basis of cognitive biases); Edward L. Glaeser, Paternalism 
and Psychology, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 133 (2006) (explaining on the basis of incentives and 
political theory why cognitive errors should rarely require paternalistic reaction). 
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paternalism has led scholars to suggest “softer” paternalistic 
interventions,173 such as debiasing through law.174 
In these respects, this Article presents a unique legal situation.  A 
paternalistic approach, built on consumer protection reasoning, would 
prescribe tax-inclusive pricing.  However, as this Article shows, such a 
measure—based on the cognitive limitation of individuals—may actually 
diminish consumer well-being.  De-biasing in this context is not necessarily 
desirable.  Under-valuation of tax burdens might be generally a welfare-
increasing bias.  If any paternalistic measure is to be considered—although 
none is advocated by this Article—it might be one that supports bias, rather 
than de-bias, in consumer under-valuation of taxes. 
To conclude, tax-inclusive price regulation may appear, at first 
glance, to be the socially appropriate response to consumer under-valuation 
errors:  Regulation of tax-inclusive pricing presents no constitutional 
obstacles;175 it is simple to implement;176 it seems to present no potential 
 
 173. See Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is ot an 
Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159, 1184–88 (2003) (suggesting an approach of steering 
individuals in a direction that improves their welfare); RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. 
SUNSTEIN, NUDGE:  IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008) 
(same); J.D. Trout, Paternalism and Cognitive Bias, 24 LAW & PHIL. 393, 425–33 (2005) 
(advising using individuals’ biases to improve their welfare); Ted O’Donoghue & Matthew 
Rabin, Optimal Sin Taxes, 90 J. PUB. ECON. 1825, 1827–36 (2006) (arguing that given self-
control biases in consumption, corrective taxes can improve social welfare); Colin Camerer 
et al., Regulation for Conservatives:  Behavioral Economics and the Case for “Asymmetric 
Paternalism”, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211, 1219–33 (2003) (describing “asymmetric 
paternalism” which benefits biased individuals with little effect on non-biased individuals).  
Compare Glaeser, supra note 172, at 149–56 (warning against soft paternalism). 
 174. See, e.g., Linda Babcock et al., Creating Convergence:  Debiasing Biased 
Litigants, 22 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 913 (1997) (proposing a procedure to debias litigants’ 
self-serving biases); Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 199, 206–24 (2006) (suggesting legal reforms that would tend to debias 
individuals who suffer from bounded rationality); McCaffery, Cognitive Theory, supra note 
49, at 1935–36 (suggesting certain ways of debiasing biased taxpayers).  Debiasing 
procedures have been examined in the psychological literature as well.  See, e.g., JUDGMENT 
UNDER UNCERTAINTY:  HEURISTICS AND BIASES, pt. VIII (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982).  
 175. See, e.g., Pitofsky, supra note 108, at 671–73. 
 176. Tax inclusion as information regulation is considerably simpler than most other 
kinds of information regulation.  See, e.g., Howard Beales et al., The Efficient Regulation of 
Consumer Information, 24 J. L. & ECON. 491, 513–31 (1981) (suggesting regulatory 
measures that aim at providing missing market information); Paul H. Rubin, Information 
Regulation, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 271 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & 
Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000) (discussing the advantages and limitations of information 
regulation); see also generally Clifford Winston, The Efficacy of Information Policy:  A 
Review of Archon Fung, Mary Graham, and David Weil’s Full Disclosure:  The Perils and 
Promise of Transparency, 46 J. ECON. LITERATURE 704 (2008) (presenting a skeptical view 
of information regulation). 
2010] TAX-EXCLUSIVE PRICIG 261 
problems of government (regulatory) failure;177 and it appears to be an 
appropriate case for ex ante regulation.178  Nonetheless, this Article shows 
that consumer under-valuation of taxes can be beneficial for consumers, 
and therefore, to the extent that tax-exclusive pricing induces under-
valuation, it can be socially desirable.  Thus, if consumers under-estimate 
tax-exclusive prices—whether for the short run only or whether only a 
portion of consumers are biased—society may be better off.  If consumers 
are actually not confused or misled by tax-exclusive prices and can easily or 
quickly educate and debias themselves, then tax-inclusive prices are also 
unnecessary.  The case for tax-inclusive pricing regulation, therefore, is 
weaker than commonly believed and can be justified on a much narrower 
scope. 
 
 177. See, e.g., CHARLES WOLF, MARKETS OR GOVERNMENTS: CHOOSING BETWEEN 
IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES Chs. 4, 5 (1989) (discussing government failures and their 
causes); SUNSTEIN, supra note 163, Ch. 3 (1990) (same); JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY:  
WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY THEY DO IT (1989) (closely studying 
bureaucratic failures); Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. 
& MGMT. SCI. 335 (1974) (analyzing public choice theories of regulation). 
 178. See, e.g., Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 357 (1984). 
